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This thesis examines the American defense policy decision to assign the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GMD) portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) mission to units of the Colorado and Alaska National Guard.  The history of the 
Nike Ajax, Nike Hercules, Sentinel and Safeguard programs are examined to identify the 
origins of support for this decision.  First-hand sources provide evidence that the National 
Guard performance in the Nike air defense program is a record of parity and some 
superiority to equivalent active Army units.  Previously documented records of Nike unit 
inspections and evaluations are included.  Perhaps for the first time, the results of a 
declassified U.S. Army study accepting National Guard participation in the 
Sentinel/Safeguard missions is reported.  Pressures, competing interests and election 
politics within the context of the American governmental institutions provide insights 
into the difficult path followed to reach President George W. Bush's 2004 operational 
declaration, and the uncertainties lying ahead for the Missile-Age Minutemen.  The 
international relations area includes an over-view of the sources of the missile threat to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as possible an 
effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the 
territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack… 
- National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38) 
 
A. OVERVIEW  
The realm of United States Defense Policy has experienced a spirited and 
sometimes heated debate in recent years on the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).  
Notably, this debate has evolved into a highly partisan political battle.  For almost 20 
years, Congressional Democrats and some scientific organizations have stood in 
opposition to BMD proposals regardless of which party held the White House. 
The decades-long focus of their criticism has remained steadfast and constant 
through the American Military programs of the 1970s named Nike Zeus, Sentinel, and 
finally the cancelled Safeguard.  President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) (also known by the purposefully fanciful label “Star Wars”) served to re-ignite a 
debate that can trace its origins back almost 50 years.1
The American ambition to defeat a hostile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) attack against the United States begins in the aftermath of World War II.  The 
advent of the German V-2 Rocket (the first Tactical, or Theater, Ballistic Missile – TBM) 
was the critical influence on the 29 May 1946 Stillwell Board Report that recommended 
the United States pursue the capability to defend itself against such weapons.2  
Throughout the pages of various military history texts, and the record of the Defense 
policy of the United States of America, is an intriguing inter-mingling of successes, 
failures, controversies, the U.S. Army, and some seldom recognized contributions by 
America’s National Guard.  Inherent in this record is a varied collection of opposition 
 
1 Baucom, Donald R., “Ballistic Missile Defense:  A Short History.”  May, 2000.  Copy acquired from 
the Internet at [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/briefhis.html] (25 APR 03). 
2 Ibid. 
2 
elements that have produced a significant record of arguments against the high expense, 
disputed science, and unproven military and diplomatic value of ballistic missile defense. 
Steep costs and the uncertain security benefits of BMD are among the critics’ 
most recognizable objections.  The perceived effectiveness of Soviet ICBM 
countermeasures contributed to the demise of the costly Safeguard program in the early 
1970s, and continued as a derogatory factor against the early record National Missile 
Defense (NMD) proposals of the late 1990s.  BMD critics have consistently voiced dire 
predictions of the certainty of negative reactions from Russia, The Peoples Republic of 
China, and the traditional U.S. Cold-War Allies.  These arguments have also expanded to 
include complaints that BMD threatens the foundations of three decades of peace and 
stability attributed to arms control agreements, including Material Control Protection and 
Accountability (MPCA), and may actually lead to increased proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) that do not require an ICBM in order to threaten America. 
Weighing in as the proponent stands the record of the distinctly conservative, and 
largely Republican Party-associated, supporters of BMD.  Since President Reagan’s SDI, 
GOP advocates in the Congress and succeeding administrations have stood behind a basic 
premise that it is immoral and unacceptable to not pursue a ballistic missile defense 
capability.  BMD supporters further this position by voicing high praise for the assured 
development of revolutionary U.S. advances in radar, laser, and data processing 
technologies.  They see this capability as a fortuitous counter to the ominous spread of 
nuclear and ballistic missile technologies throughout an allegedly irrational and 
uncontrollable world.  A strategic point advanced by BMD supporters focuses on the 
consequences of adversaries possessing ICBMs that could curtail U.S. options in 
diplomatic forums, and inhibit some military options to respond to world-wide crisis and 
threats to vital U.S. interests.  Concerns that a United States susceptible to ICBM 
“blackmail” would weaken allied confidence in defense agreements also bolsters the 
cause of the BMD supporters. 
3 
James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon extensively cover all of these points 
in, Defending America.3  On the specific issue of the partisan political debate, Lindsay 
and O’Hanlon note that… 
Both sides in the NMD debate make valid points. But rather than 
generating a serious discussion of how each side’s legitimate concerns can 
be forged into a sensible policy for the country, the current debate has 
degenerated into a dialogue of the deaf.4
Thus, both sides of the debate have added their share to an abundant record of 
testimony, legislative proposals, and public documents.  However, it seems that all too 
often there has been a limited demonstration of the capacity for listening, and a lack of 
courteous acknowledgement to go along with the enthusiastic advocacy of the positions 
at either extreme.  The bulk of this acrimonious record starts with the announcement of 
SDI by President Reagan and the subsequent volumes of material produced in both 
support and opposition to that program. 
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union precipitated the 
decline of political support, public interest, and Congressional funding for SDI.  The 
early 1990s saw the pursuit of the robust space-based systems of SDI curtailed into a 
more limited long-term research program.5  As relations between the U.S. and the new 
Russian Federation improved, Congressional funding and popular interest in BMD 
declined.  However, the intriguing prospect of preventing an ICBM from actually striking 
the territory of the United States would not disappear.  For that goal, U.S. military 
research and development efforts in BMD continued.  For the purposes of this writing, 
the U.S. Army reached a milestone decision in 1996. 
In that year, a little noticed Department of Defense press release announced the 
decision that the U.S. Army soldiers designated to operate the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense (GMD) system include members of the National Guard.6  U.S. Army Lt. Gen. 
                                                 
3 Lindsay, James M., and O’Hanlon, Michael E., Defending America: A Case for Limited National 
Missile Defense.  The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2001. 
4 Ibid, page 2. 
5 This was the George H.W. Bush administration policy.  Ibid, page 3. 
6 Biddle, Mike “News Analysis: Army Space and Strategic Defense Command changes its focus.”  
Army News Service, Washington, DC.  Copy obtained from the Internet at [http://www.defenselink.mil] (15 
July 1996). 
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John Costello confirmed this decision in 1999, and further specified that the GMD force 
would consist “predominately” of National Guard members.7
For some observers, the prospect of this new National Guard mission is a return to 
a founding principle of the United States, consistently described as the “militia 
tradition.”8  Supporters of this move by the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army 
note that the National Guard admirably performed the missile-based Nike Air Defense 
mission during the 1960s and 1970s.  Yet, others would offer the critical question of why 
the active Army, and the Department of Defense, would pass this critical mission to the 
National Guard.  The two-fold subjects of this Thesis are the issues involved in this return 
to a reliance on citizen-soldiers to perform an active mission in the first-line of defense 
for the nation, and the national defense policy debate on BMD. 
An abundant body of literature exists on the technology and international relations 
aspects of BMD, ICBMs, and the control of nuclear arms.  This Thesis seeks to address 
questions that are relevant to the decision that the pre-eminent national defense system of 
the 21st Century would be manned, and operated, by modern Minutemen—members of 
the National Guard—and offer support that this manning decision is in the best interests 
of the nation. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This Thesis provides an analysis of the American defense policy decision to 
assign the GMD mission to the National Guard.  The continuing debate on the technology 
and science of ballistic missiles is better left to other works and authors.  This work has a 
limited focus on the connection between the decision to pursue ballistic missile defense, 
and the implications of that decision on citizen-soldiers in Alaska, California and 
Colorado.  Using an historical analysis of the cold war Nike air defense program, and a 
sampling of the most recent literature, this Thesis seeks to link the successful precedent 
of the National Guard defending the American homeland against bomber attack in the 
 
7 Atkinson, David “National Guard to Operate Large Portion of NMD System.”  Defense Daily.  
Washington, DC, 7 May 1999. 
8 For a recent, and extensive analysis of this concept see: Stentiford, Barry M., The American Home 
Guard:  The State Militia in the Twentieth Century.  Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 
June 2002. 
5 
1960s and 1970s, and to build an assurance of similar success in the 21st Century in the 
defense against attack by ICBMs. 
Many of the references used for this Thesis are not new to a reader knowledgeable 
on the subject of BMD.  Established works that have influenced the public debate on this 
program during the past four years were consulted in the preparation of this Thesis.  What 
is potentially less familiar are the references to the Nike air defense program, and 
specifically the roles, responsibilities, and achievements of National Guard.  Fortunately, 
first-hand accounts from veterans of the National Guard Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules 
programs are still available and provided valuable contributions to this work. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of four chapters beginning with this introduction.  The second 
chapter, The Policy of Ballistic Missile Defense, explores the American pursuit of BMD 
from 1958 to early in 2004, the points of influence in the U.S. Administration, Congress, 
the process of U.S. defense policy and threat analysis, and the implications of BMD for 
the relationships between the United States and the international community.  The third 
chapter, Roles, Missions, and Structure, examines the precedents established by the 
National Guard performance in the Nike air defense mission.  Then the chapter continues 
in order to reach an understanding of the nature of the new BMD mission for America's 
21st Century citizen-soldiers.  Finally, the fourth chapter concludes with a summary of 
the civil-military effects of BMD, and this author’s view of the road ahead for the 
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II. THE POLICY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
A. THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ODYSSEY 
1. Key Events from 1958 to 2003 
The December 2002 ballistic missile defense deployment decision by President 
George W. Bush had been building for over fifty years.  During that history the scope and 
nature of the American concept of ballistic missile defense to defeat ICBMs in-flight has 
shifted from high atmosphere detonations using nuclear interceptors, to the orbital 
“brilliant pebbles” of SDI, and now takes the form of the curiously higher controversy 
over non-explosive kinetic interception (bullet hitting a bullet). 
The path that has led the United States to assign this new mission to the National 
Guard is a matter of objective historical analysis.  This record produces a picture of BMD 
that is much different from the heated rhetoric that preceded the Bush deployment 
announcement.9    Fortunately, a large body of the disputed aspects of BMD lies in the 
areas of scientific and technical debate.  These issues have little to do with the 
responsibilities of the citizen-soldiers who will operate the GMD system (Refer to 
Appendix B - The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Structure, for more 
information). 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense is one part of the system that comprises the 
U.S. Global Missile Defense program (also labeled “GMD”).  Or, as Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld prefers, the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).  
Whether this proliferation of titles and acronyms is a complicating aspect of U.S. defense 
policy, or reassuring, is likely to depend on each individual’s position as a missile 
defense subject matter novice, critic or advocate.  The U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force 
each have a current part of the overall program. 
Defeating an ICBM during the early boost phase of the launch is the goal of a 
Navy ship-based anti-missile capability, along with the Air Force’s Air-Borne Laser 
 
9 Unless otherwise cited, historical references are from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) official 
histories by Dr. Donald R. Baucom.  “NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW (1993-2000)” 
and “Missile Defense Milestones:  1944 – 2000.”  Both acquired from the Internet at: 
[http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html-old/milestone.html] (25 APR 03). 
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(ABL).  Later in the flight path of the target ICBM, the Army’s GMD would attack 
during the most vulnerable mid-course segment.  However, this multi-service program 
structure has not always described the U.S. BMD doctrine and policy. 
On 16 January 1958, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy established the first 
link of the Army and the National Guard to the task of shooting-down ICBMs.  
Specifically, he assigned primary responsibility for the ballistic missile defense mission 
to the U.S. Army.  The Army’s Nike Zeus project became the primary U.S. BMD system 
for further research and development, and the Air Force’s Project Wizard was cancelled.  
Thus, after 12 years, U.S. policy and doctrine had progressed from initially recognizing 
the ballistic missile threat and recommending action in 1946, to the point of a dedicated 
research and development effort to achieve an American capability to destroy ICBMs. 
However, ICBMs did not represent the perceived primary threat to the United 
States in the late 1950s.  The goal of the Nike Zeus program was research and 
development for a long-term, future deployment.  Building a defense against the  
perceived threat of the long-range bombers of the Soviet Union was the immediate 
mission placed before the leadership of the U.S. Department of Defense. 
The dominant U.S. system in the late-1950s for defending against an attack by the 
Soviet Union’s strategic bombers was the Nike Ajax anti-aircraft missile systems.  Before 
the end of 1958, the first National Guard unit was operating Nike Ajax missiles in a 
defensive belt around Los Angeles, California.10  By 1966, this unit and dozens more had 
converted to the nuclear warhead capable, and extended range, Nike Hercules and were 
operating 48 of the Army’s 112 firing units (43% of the total force) in 16 states to protect 
18 cities or military sites.11
The history of the U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) demonstrates 
the concept of integrating the active duty Army and the National Guard long before U.S. 
 
10 Moeller, Stephen P., “Vigilant and Invincible: United States Army Air Defense Command.”  Air 
Defense Artillery. HQDA PB 44-95-3, May-June 1995, pages 2-42.  Copy obtained from the Internet at: 
[http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/vigilant/sus-intro.html] (18 April 2003). 
11 Ibid.  Chapter 3, “The National Guard” sub-title. Also Doubler, Michael D. and Listman, John W., 
Jr., The National Guard: An Illustrated History of America’s Citizen-Soldiers.  Pages 107-108.  First 
edition, Brassey’s Inc., Dulles, Virginia, USA. 2003. 
9 
                                                
Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams made such integration a key point of 
the Army’s Total Force doctrine in the 1970s.12
ARADCOM faced a difficult personnel situation from the beginning of the air 
defense mission.  The personnel requirements of a growing U.S. commitment to the war 
in Vietnam were the priority for military manpower over the homeland air defense 
mission. ARADCOM’s solution to the dilemma of continually increasing U.S. Army 
manpower demands to divert soldiers for the fighting in Vietnam came through an 
organizational structure that shared the mission with the National Guard. 
This precedent setting program saved the U.S. over $11 million each year and 
freed enough personnel spaces to man nearly two combat brigades.13  Simultaneous with 
the research and development of the ballistic missile defense Nike Zeus program, active 
duty, or National Guard manned, units using high explosive Nike Ajax and eventually 
nuclear-armed Nike Hercules missiles dotted the continental U.S., Alaska and Hawaii. 14  
The 24-year life cycle of ARADCOM marked the high-risk period when the U.S. defense 
policy was committed to destroying formations of Soviet bombers by the close proximity 
detonation of a nuclear warhead in the high atmosphere.  The same engagement concept 
guided the development of the Nike Zeus, Sentinel and Safeguard BMD programs. 
In 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced the Sentinel BMD 
program.  Having failed to dissuade the Soviet Union from continuing its anti-ballistic 
missile program there was little choice but to counter with the deployment of a similar 
U.S. defensive capability.  Five years earlier (1962) the Army had achieved arguable 
success with close proximity intercept of test fired ICBMs by Nike Zeus missiles (the 
first within 2 kilometers and the second within 200 meters).  Still, this nuclear tipped 
interceptor system would not get beyond the testing phase. 
 
12 Kozaryn, Linda D., “Army Reserve Duty Has 'Changed Forever'”  The comments of US Army 
Reserve Chief, Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Plewes. American Forces Press Service.  22 January 2002.  Copy 
obtained from the Internet at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01222002_200201225.html] (12 
May 2003). Also, Doubler and Listman, pages 116-117. 
13 Doubler, Michael D., I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000.  
Department of the Army Pamphlet number 130-1, 2001.  Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 
14 Moeller, Chapter 3, “The National Guard” sub-title. 
10 
                                                
The change to the Nixon administration brought a policy shift to the renamed, and 
more limited, Safeguard program that would abandon the defense of cities and only offer 
BMD coverage from two defensive sites to cover all of the U.S. with ICBM fields in 
Montana and North Dakota.  Even that plan came under increased scrutiny after the U.S. 
and the USSR signed the ABM Treaty in 1972. 
The development and deployment of Safeguard continued until 1976.  However, 
only the Stanley R. Mickelson Safeguard Complex in North Dakota was completed.  The 
Defense Department cancelled the second site.  Although it clearly complied with the 
ABM Treaty, budget problems led to its demise.  The dual missile system designed for 
Sentinel began to take shape.  The North Dakota complex was established around the 
layered design of the long-range Spartan and short-range Sprite missiles.  With the radar 
and fire control systems fully tested, Safeguard was declared operational in 1974.  This 
apparent success was no match for changing political and fiscal policy. 
With Defense Department complacency during Donald Rumsfeld’s first tenure as 
Secretary, Congress ordered its closure and deactivation after only four months.  The 
Safeguard program had become nearly unsupportable once the Defense Department 
confirmed its vulnerability to the newest Soviet ICBMs equipped with Multiple Re-entry 
Vehicle (MRV) warheads.  Political support in the Ford Administration for anti-ballistic 
missile defenses waned in the face of Post-Watergate controversies, the Arab Oil 
Embargo, and as the post-Vietnam military draw down took effect. 
Congressional Defense and Budget critics found a lucrative target in Safeguard, 
although the termination decision discarded the equivalent investment of $20 Billion (in 
2001 dollars).15  Eliminating the expensive BMD program was an acceptable action with 
the growing confidence that arms control agreements, the Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks (SALT), the ABM Treaty, and the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine 
would combine to prevent Nuclear War between the U.S. and the USSR.  The ABM 
Treaty and SALT had thus contributed to the end of the only operational U.S. BMD 
system, just as the early decline of the Soviet Strategic Bomber threat closed the books on 
the Nike Air Defense program. 
 
15 Lindsay and O’Hanlon, page 3. 
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ARADCOM disbanded just as Safeguard became operational.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense designated a new command to oversee Safeguard.  For the final 
two years of its existence, ARADCOM controlled the systematic dismantling of what had 
taken over twenty years to create. 
As ARADCOM disappeared, so too did the National Guard Nike Hercules units.  
On 14 September 1974, sixteen years to the day after its first Nike battalion had become 
operational; the National Guard folded the colors of all of its remaining Nike missile 
units during impressive ceremonies at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania.16 As 
thousands of National Guard Nike Air Defense Artillery (ADA) technicians transferred to 
new units throughout the United States the respect for and commitment to these citizen-
soldiers from their former active Army Commanding General was demonstrated in a final 
act.  The ARADCOM Commanding General intervened to help the last 300 citizen-
soldiers find new assignments, and made special recommendations for the retention and 
promotion of Nike Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers.17
Reading the historical record to 1974 can lead to the reasonable conclusion that 
the U.S. trek towards ballistic missile defense had ended.  The only U.S. BMD site was in 
mothballs and the soldiers who had previously operated missile defenses had been 
scattered.  Had it not been for U.S. Army Research and Development efforts, the record 
of BMD would have closed. 
During the years 1976 to 1984, the Army continued a subdued research and 
development program that accepted that systems using the nuclear warhead proximity 
interceptor had no chance of deployment, let alone any policy or fiscal support.  Rising 
public awareness and criticism of such nuclear weapons near populated areas had 
contributed to the demise of Sentinel and Safeguard.  Instead, the Army acted in pursuit 
of “hit-to-kill” technology.  This effort matched with the next fortuitous turn in the 
political climate when President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense 
Initiative in March 1983.  However, another decade would pass before events matured 
the program to the point where the National Guard would once again enter the picture. 
 
16 National Guardsman, November 1974, published by the National Guard Association of the United 
States, Washington, D.C., pages 2-8. Cited in Doubler, I am the Guard. Page 243. 
17 Moeller.  Chapter 4, “Phasing Out.”  Sub-section, “ARADCOM.” 
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During the George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton Presidencies, partisan 
debate vied for public and political support for BMD.  Critics focused their efforts on 
sustaining diplomatic precedents and clear opposition to any action or policy that could 
be seen as producing a violation, or even the demise, of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty in order to make BMD a reality.18  The decades of the Cold War had 
produced a vocal population of political and scientific centers of influence who were 
committed to MAD as the most viable security policy against ballistic missile attacks. 
From 1983 to 2002 the prospects for National Missile Defense, or NMD, were 
subjected to the turmoil of American politics.  A 1991 defense act established a 1996 goal 
of a “…cost-effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant antiballistic 
missile system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment of an antiballistic 
missile system."  In 1993, the Clinton Administration’s Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) 
resulted in a shift in policy that curtailed NMD activities, and directed funding and 
administration emphasis to producing shorter-range theater defenses. 
As the 1990s progressed, protesting scientific groups openly voiced their disbelief 
of viability of the hit-to-kill system and the technologies involved in the ability to 
acquire, track, and guide a U.S. interceptor to destroy an attacking ICBM.19  As late as 
July 2003 the American Physical Society published a report critical of boost-phase 
technologies.20  The arguments of these technologically astute analysts on the outside of 
the military-industrial establishment complemented the agenda of traditional, Cold-War, 
arms control advocates defending the sanctity of the ABM Treaty.  Still, the U.S. 
Department of Defense managers and the defense contractors charged with constructing 
the NMD system stuck to their tasks. 
It was not until the release of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report that large-
scale public attention returned to the concept of protecting the American people from 
 
18 Lebovic, James H., “The Law of Small Numbers: Deterrence and National Missile Defense.”  The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution.  Pages 455-483.  Journal of the Peace Science Society (International).  Vol. 
46, No. 4, AUG 02.  Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.   
19 Predominantly, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Global Security.com, and the Union 
of Concerned Scientists. 
20 Graham, Bradley, “Questions on Missile Defense Plans: Scientists’ Report Questions Technology’s 
Effectiveness.”  Washington Post.  Wednesday, 16 July 2003; page A02.  Copy obtained from the Internet 
at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61235-2003Jul15?language=printer] (17 July 2003). 
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ICBM attack.21  As if on cue, the next month (31 August 1998) North Korea launched its 
Taepo Dong-1 missile over Japan.  According to the report in The Washington Times, the 
missile traveled about 1,000 miles.  BMD advocates now had a clear and easily 
identifiable threat.  An openly belligerent North Korea, possessing a small number of 
multi-state ballistic missiles, was a more viable justification for BMDS deployment than 
any concept linked to the more substantial arsenals of the established nuclear nations. 
The will of the Republican led United States Congress became national policy on 
22 July 1999 when President Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
(Public Law 106-38) into law.22  Since then, the key clause of the Act has become a 
rallying cry for BMD supporters. 
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as possible an 
effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the 
territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to 
the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of 
funds for National Missile Defense. 
Even at this point in the history of BMD the partisan competition was not 
curtailed.  Popular media outlets joined the fray by using the lure of the technology and 
romantic appeal of destroying rockets in-flight to attract public attention.23  Politically, 
the opponents of BMD could rely on Senator Joseph Biden, among others, to keep 
opposing views in public view.24
By 1999, the alternative to the cold war doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction 
had become the focus of a collection of U.S. Department of Defense research, 
development, and technology exploration programs known under the label National 
 
21 The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. (Rumsfeld 
Commission).  Copy available from the Internet at [http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm] (28 April 
2003). 
22 United States Congress, House of Representatives, “Declaration of Policy of the United States 
Concerning National Missile Defense Deployment.”  Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives on H.R. 4, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2 March 1999.  And, 
United States Senate, “National Missile Defense Act of 1999.”  Report 106-4, Calendar No. 16, 106th 
Congress, 1st Session, to accompany Senate Bill 257, 12 February 1999. 
23 Wilson, Jim, “What's Up with Missile Defense: A Downsized Star Wars Missile Defense Shield 
Takes Aim at Rogue Nations.”  Popular Mechanics, May 2000. 
24 United States Congress, “NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE.” Congressional Record Senate – 25 
May 2000, Page: S4399 remarks of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.. 
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Missile Defense, or NMD.  It would only take the Defense Department a few months to 
designate the military service that would defend America against the newly defined 
danger of “limited or accidental ICBM attack by a rogue nation.” 
In November 1999, the Department of Defense designated the U.S. Army as the 
lead military service for the land-based element of NMD (later renamed GMD).  This 
ended the service rivalry between the Army and the Air Force centered on the proposal to 
use former Minuteman boosters and silos for GMD.  Throughout this period work 
continued with very little fanfare, and almost no public reaction, on the National Guard 
role and responsibility to provide most of the soldiers to operate the GMD system.  Even 
with progress on the military side of BMD did not abate the conflicts between political 
forces. 
In the waning days of the Clinton administration, the opposition held to its 
contention of NMD as a budget-busting and technologically ill-advised program.  As the 
2000 Presidential Campaign progressed, the platforms of Democratic nominee Vice-
President Albert Gore, Jr., and Republican nominee Governor George W. Bush presented 
a clear distinction on the NMD issue. 
An Al Gore presidency gave all appearances of continuing the approach of the 
previous eight years.  Despite the pronouncements of the Rumsfeld and Hart-Rudman 
Commissions on the ICBM threat, there was little indication that the ascension of Al 
Gore to the White House would signal a divergence in the policies and conduct of the 
NMD program as a slow and deliberate research and development effort. 
The campaign of Texas Governor George W. Bush presented a sharp contrast.  
The Clinton announcement in May 2000 to defer the deployment decision to the next 
administration led to a Bush campaign platform position that assured there would be a 
NMD deployment.25  With Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush camp NMD was not just a 
possibility in the event of a Bush victory; it was a certainty.  The 2000 Bush Presidential 
Campaign position on NMD was clear. 
 
25 “Excerpts from Bush's Remarks on National Security and Arms Policy.”  The New York Times.  24 
May 2000.  Copy obtained from the Internet at [http:// nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/052400wh-bush-
text.html] (31 May 2000). 
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It is time to leave the Cold War behind.  America must build effective 
missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest 
possible date.  Our missile defense must be designed to protect all 50 
states—and our friends and allies and our deployed forces overseas—from 
missile attacks by rogue nations, or accidental launches.26
The prolonged outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential contest made history and 
placed George W. Bush in the position to make a distinctive change in the defense policy 
of the United States.  By December of 2001, the new Bush administration had 
consolidated the reigns of power in Washington, D.C., and completed the necessary 
consultations with the Russian Federation (as the successor to the Soviet Union, the other 
signatory of the ABM Treaty).  The winds of change were evident, as was the momentum 
of the Bush administration. 
2. The Decision to Deploy Missile Defenses 
"Defense is moral; offense is immoral!"  Alexsei N. Kosygin, Soviet 
Premier, 23 June 1967.27
On 13 December 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush notified 
the Russian Federation, and the world, that the U.S. was withdrawing from the 1972 
ABM Treaty.28  This turned the historical tables on the positions held by the U.S. and 
USSR at the 1967 Glassboro summit.  Thirty-four years earlier, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had tried to convince the leaders of 
the Soviet Union to abandon their efforts to deploy ballistic missile defenses. 
The consequences of the Soviet deployment could only become a U.S. move to 
add more nuclear warheads to its ICBM force to overcome these defenses.  Support for 
the defensive doctrine of retaliation and mutually assured destruction were clearly the 
basis of that U.S. position.  The above quote adequately records the Soviet response. 
 
26 “New Leadership on National Security” speech by candidate George W. Bush to the National Press 
Club, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2000.  Cited in Larsen and Wirtz, “U.S. Missile Defenses: Three 
Scenarios and their International Consequences.”  National Security Studies Quarterly.  Vol VII, Issue 4, 
page 84.  Autumn 2001. 
27 Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense.  “Missile Defense Milestones: 1944 – 2000.”  
Copy acquired from the Internet at [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html-old/milstone.html] (25 
APR 03). 
28 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “President Discusses National Missile Defense” 13 
December 2001.  Copy obtained from the Internet at [http://www.whitehouse.gov] (23 June 2003). 
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Another reversal of these positions had also occurred between President Reagan 
and Soviet President Gorbachev at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit.29  Similarly, President 
Reagan declined Gorbachev’s insistence that the U.S. curtail the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI – or “Star Wars’), just as Gorbachev had failed to believe the sincerity of 
Reagan’s offer to share the technology.  It would only be a few short years before 
Gorbachev’s confidence in the Soviet capacity to overwhelm any U.S. defense by 
continuing to build ICBMs would be undone by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
emergence of the less adversarial Russian Federation led by Boris Yeltsin. 
During the closing months of the Clinton administration the issue of the ABM 
Treaty and the 1999 Missile Defense Act had progressed to the point of the 
administration requesting Russian agreement to enter into discussions to renegotiate the 
Treaty.  The prospects of a treaty action for either President Clinton or President George 
W. Bush were poor in the U.S. Senate.   Senators Helms, Inhofe and Kyle were on record 
as opposed to a new ABM Treaty.30  On the opposite side of the aisle, the record of 
Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat, Delaware), gave little assurance that Democrats would 
have helped either President secure the necessary 2/3 majority for a ratification vote.   
From multiple points, it is clear that the most prudent, and effective, choice for 
President George W. Bush in 2001 was to abandon the ABM Treaty.  This cleared away 
another of the three strategic barriers to NMD identified by Lindsay and O’Hanlon:  the 
Cold War threat of a Superpowers arms race, the paranoia of first-strike errors in a crisis, 
and the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.31  The first two were resolved by the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the following decade of productive diplomatic and economic 
interactions between the U.S. and Russia.  While a decision on the final point would wait 
until it coincided with the installation of a new President and the horrific events of 11 
September 2001. 
Even with the declaration of the Global War on Terror, the George W. Bush 
administration did not lose sight of its determination to remove the threat of ICBM 
 
29 Powell, Colin L. and Joseph E. Presico, My American Journey. Random House, New York, 1995. 
Pages 359-360. 
30 Cable News Network (CNN), Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer.  17 OCT 99, Transcript 99101700V47.  
Cited in Lindsay and O’Hanlon, page 166. 
17 
                                                
attack.  There is little dispute that the overall Bush administration commitment to defense 
over domestic issues gained prominence after September 2001.  Congressional opposition 
to NMD funding faded as Senators from both parties shifted into a rare display of bi-
partisan unity and restored NMD funds that had been cut only weeks earlier.32
The year 2001 saw President George W. Bush declaring the intention of the U.S. 
to turn to a defensive system to shoot-down ICBMs, rather than continue the cold war 
mutually assured destruction doctrine of offensive exchanges.  In due course, the BMDS 
decision was specified by the Department of Defense as a limited deployment that closely 
matches the recommendation of Lindsay and O’Hanlon.  Decades of research and 
development had arrived at the decision to commit the United States to create an 
operational ballistic missile defensive system.  On 17 December 2002, a Department of 
Defense news release provided these details of a limited BMD capability combined with 
the elimination of the ABM Treaty. 33
The initial set of capabilities planned for 2004-2005 will include: 
* Up to 20 ground-based interceptors capable of intercepting and 
destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of 
flight located at Ft. Greely, Alaska (16 interceptors) and Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California. (4 interceptors); 
*  Up to 20 sea-based interceptors employed on existing Aegis ships to 
intercept ballistic missiles in the first few minutes after they are launched, 
during the boost and ascent phases of flight; 
*  Deployment of air-transportable Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-
3) systems to intercept short and medium range ballistic missiles; 
*  Land, sea and space-based sensors, including existing early warning 
satellites, an upgraded radar now located at Shemya, Alaska, and a new  
 
31 Lindsay and O’Hanlon, pages 4-5. 
32 NMD funding in the 2002 Defense Authorization Act was cut $1.3 Billion by Senate Democrats, 
only to be restored by the House-Senate Conference following the 9-11-01 attacks. 
33 United States Department of Defense, “Missile Defense Operations Announcement.”  News release 
Number 642-02.  Copy obtained from the Internet at 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/b12172002_bt642-02.html] (17 December 2002). 
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sea-based X-band radar, upgrading existing early warning radars in the 
United Kingdom and Greenland and use of radars and other sensors now 
on Aegis cruisers and destroyers. 
For many in the arms control arena, and particularly the NMD critics, the 
cornerstone of over thirty years of diplomatic arms-control was swept aside.  The ABM 
Treaty was gone, and with it the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.  In its place 
was a new U.S. doctrine that for the first time melded the option to defend against an 
ICBM attack with the purely offensive counter-attack scenarios of nuclear strike and 
counter-strike.34  For almost fifty years, the cold war bi-polar relationship of nuclear 
brinksmanship between the U.S. and the USSR had been an absolute factor in domestic 
policy and international relations.  By 2001, this constant feature of the international 
relations between the new Russia and the United States was fading. 
To emphasize this new environment, a simple bureaucratic change elevated the 
power and prestige of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).  The new 
designation as the Missile Defense Agency “…recognizes the national priority and 
mission emphasis on missile defense.”35  Beyond the change of name, a 2 January 2002 
Secretary of Defense memorandum provided details on the “Missile Defense Program 
Direction.”36  Analysis of these five pages provides insights into the Presidential decision 
that arrived before the close of the year. 
Throughout this document, it is clear that Mr. Rumsfeld was interested in 
consolidating all aspects of the Missile Defense Program under the MDA, and it’s 
Director, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish.  Under this enhanced 
leadership authority, General Kadish received clear imperatives:  deploy and 
continuously improve BMDS, have the flexibility to redirect efforts, conduct limited but 
rapid fielding of systems, and keep the program integrated and open to allies.  To 
 
34 Palmore, Julian, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the New Triad.”  Defense & Security Analysis.  Vol. 
18, No. 3, Page 262.  Carfax Publishing, Taylor and Francis Group, Philadelphia, PA.  September 2002. 
35 United States Department of Defense “DOD Establishes Missile Defense Agency.”  Press Release, 
no. 008-02, 4 January 2002.  Copy obtained from the Internet at 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/b01042002_bt008-02.html] (19 June 2003). 
36 United States Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Missile 
Defense Program Direction” dated 2 January 2002.  Adobe Acrobat copy (7 pages) obtained from the 
Internet at [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/progdir.pdf] (17 June 2003). 
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encourage a flexible BMDS acquisition process, General Kadish was delegated the 
authority to use “transactions other than contracts, grants and cooperative agreements to 
carry out basic, applied, and advanced research.”  Similarly, old Service (Army, Navy or 
Air Force) initiated and controlled missile defense documents were cancelled, along with 
a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), and General Kadish was 
directed to create new capability standards across all BMDS elements.37  
Secretary Rumsfeld reserved for himself the authority to move Research 
Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) assets (i.e., funding, personnel and 
equipment – missiles) to support emergencies or deployments.  In a clear gesture of 
priority among all other DOD activities, MDA was to get the most talented people at 
100% of authorized manning levels.  A final clause gave General Kadish direct access to 
coordinate with the DOD Executive Agent for Space (the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force, and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office – NRO) for the 
“…management, integration, and interoperability [of BMDS] with existing and planned 
space systems.38  Linking all of these roles, responsibilities, processes and procedures 
together are the four Secretary of Defense priorities that open the document.39  
This document provides the Secretary of Defense’s priorities and guidance 
for the Department’s Missile Defense Program.  The following are the top 
four missile defense priorities for the Department of Defense: 
• First, to defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies, and friends. 
• Second, to employ a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that layers 
defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight (i.e., boost, 
midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of threats. 
• Third, to enable the Services to field elements of the overall BMDS as 
soon as practicable.  To that end, we have started to deploy the Patriot 
advanced Capability-3 system this year, after successful testing, as the first 
line of defense against short-range missiles. 
• Fourth, to develop and test technologies, use prototype and test assets to 
provide early capability, if necessary, and improve the effectiveness of 
deployed capability by inserting new technologies as they become 
available or when the threat warrants an accelerated capability. 
 
37 Ibid, attachment page 3. 
38 Ibid, attachment page 4. 
39 Ibid, attachment page 1. 
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Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was designated to chair the Senior 
Executive Council (SEC) created to support General Kadish and “…provide policy, 
planning and programming guidance; oversee the Department’s missile defense 
activities; and approve BMDS fielding recommendations.”40  The length of a seven-page 
document should not convey the message that this document was a simple undertaking.  
Quite to the contrary, Table 1, BMDS Management, summarizes the three-phase BMDS 
management structure and the new relationships and responsibilities between the Services 
and the MDA created by Mr. Rumsfeld to achieve his priorities. 
 
Table 1.   BMDS Management 
 Actions and Responsibilities 
Management 
Phases Senior Executive Council Missile Defense Agency 
Services 
(Army, Navy, Air Force and 
Marine Corps) 
Development 
• Policy, Planning, 
programming, DOD 
Missile Program oversight, 
and approve fielding. 
• Recommend to the Sec 
Def, RDT&E assets shift to 
emergency deployment, or 
contingency, operations. 
• Approve BMDS element 
move to transition phase 
(budget & Force Structure). 
• Management Authority 
• Coordinate with Regional 
Combatant Commanders and 
Services 
• Recommend element move 
to transition phase 
• RDT&E budget 
• Developmental Testing & 
Evaluation 
• Provide guidance and 
advice on desired 
capabilities, operational 
approaches, and suitability 
and supportability features. 
• Provide forces to support 
early fielding and/or 
contingency capability 
Transition 
• USD (AT&L) oversight 
of Service procurement 
• BMDS Management 
Authority 
• Designates Operational 
Test Agent 





 • Sets interoperability 
standards 
• BMDS System 
Management Authority 
• Comply with MDA 
standards for 
interoperability 
• Provide, with the Defense 
agencies, for operation(s) 
and support 
 
Shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld’s letter, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L), Mr. E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr., 
                                                 
40 Ibid, attachment page 2. 
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issued a letter titled “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Implementation Guidance.”41  As 
the immediate civilian supervisor of General Kadish it was his responsibility to put into 
writing any additional details and precision not covered in the earlier document.  This 
included eleven requirements for a program plan, and six authority delegations.  Most 
importantly, policy and public testimony were showing that the work of the DOD and the 
MDA began to shift away from the purely research and development focus that had 
marked nearly two-decades of effort since SDI. 
In one interpretation, fulfilling the needs of the National Guard soldiers 
designated to operate the GMD system became the measurement of the success of the 
MDA.  Since then, the Defense Department has shown remarkable clarity in the pursuit 
of BMD.  An October 2002 Congressional Hearing received this assurance, "…results are 
being measured in terms of putting things in the hands of the warfighter."42  In this case, 
the National Guard citizen-soldiers are the “warfighters.”  Over a year later, at a March 
2003 congressional hearing, three deputies to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld presented a 
broad-scope program.43  Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 
J.D. Crouch, II, stated that: 
We knew North Korea was developing longer-range missiles, but we were 
surprised at the presence of a third stage on the missile…We have been 
surprised many times in the past by foreign ballistic missile developments. 
We likely will be surprised again in the future…44
With MDA and Department of Defense leadership and resources focused on the 
needs of the National Guard Warfighters, these citizen-soldiers must perform the tasks of 
training and then executing the GMD mission.  What remains are considerations on the 
 
41 United States Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: 
Ballistic Missile Defense Program Implementation Guidance” dated 13 February 2002.  Adobe Acrobat 
copy (4 pages) obtained from the Internet at [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/progimp.pdf] (7 
June 2004). 
42 Little, Terry R., Director, Kinetic Energy (Ke) Boost Program, MDA.  Quoted in: Wall, Robert, 
“Missile Defense Focus Shifts to Fielding.”  Aviation Week & Space Technology.  Pages 27-30..  New 
York, NY.  14 OCT 02. 
43 Sample, Doug, “Pentagon Officials Tell Congress Missile Defense System ‘Moving Forward’"  
American Forces Press Service.  Washington, DC.  21 March 2003.  Copy obtained from the Internet at   
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/n03212003_200303214.html] (23 June 2003). 
44 ibid. 
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external forces that could influence American Defense policy, both on the domestic 
political scene and in the arena of international relations. 
B. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES 
President George W. Bush’s December 2002 deployment decision produced a 
significant shift in American Defense and Foreign policy.  The Department of Defense 
was now seeking to manage a national defense strategy that for the first time since the 
early 1970s includes the prospects of an operational capability to defeat an ICBM attack 
by destroying missiles in-flight, along with the Cold War mainstay deterrent doctrine of 
responding to any attack with an overwhelming nuclear counter-attack.  Simultaneously, 
Secretary Rumsfeld was pursuing an ambitious “transformation” of both the military and 
civilian arms of the Defense Department. 
As if winning the second war against Iraq were not enough, the military and 
civilian leaders of the American military services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine 
Corps) found 2003 as the year to contend with two additional and quite pointed demands. 
Secretary Rumsfeld pressed the uniformed services to perfect inter-operability and 
become faster and leaner,45 while the rapidly aging civilian workforce watched as he 
pressed for a dramatic retooling of the Defense Department civilian personnel system 
before the Congress.46 As the prospects for BMD ascended, some rightly wondered if 
other Cold War defense programs would fade. 
During the decades of the deterrence and retaliation-focused Mutually Assured 
Destruction doctrine, the Cold War nuclear triad (strategic bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic 
missile submarines) was rarely subjected to force structure reductions and budget cuts.  
With the emergence of an operational BMD capability, it is unclear if that status will 
continue.  At stake are long-term prestigious U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy roles and 
missions.  In the age of ballistic missiles defenses, what value will America continue to 
place in its own nuclear armed ICBMs, bombers, missile submarines, and carrier air 
 
45 Gilmore, Gerry J., “Change U.S. Military Now, DOD Transformation Czar Urges.”  Armed Forces 
Press Service.  Washington, D.C., 10 July 2002.  Copy obtained from the Internet at:  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/n07112002_200207111.html] (7 June 2003). 
46 Causey, Mike, “Defense civilian plan has broader reach.”  The Washington Times.  News World 
Communications, Washington, D.C..  3 June 2003.  Copy obtained on from the Internet at   
[http://dynamic.washtimes.com/print_story.cfm?StoryID=200306-122045-7006r] (7 June 2003). 
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wings?  The perceptions and plans of the Air Force and Navy must now contend with the 
accelerated appearance of an Army capability that, if successful, diminishes the role of 
the other services’ nuclear attack/counter-attack systems. 
An operational BMD shifts the largest share of responsibility for the deterrence of 
minor nuclear powers and “rogue” players to the Army.  It is no longer sufficient for the 
traditional nuclear services to promise catastrophic thermonuclear response.  Reliance on 
this reactionary capability alone leaves the U.S. military in the undesirable circumstance 
of watching passively as American territory, or a critical overseas interest, receives an 
ICBM attack (with or without a WMD warhead).  In a significant change from the Cold 
War, the U.S. Army and National Guard will conceivably stand ready to defeat a limited 
attack, prevent a missile from striking American soil, and this will not involve the release 
of a nuclear device into the earth’s atmosphere.  Some of the Air Force and Navy 
initiatives formed under the title of transformation offer key insights into a changed U.S. 
military.  All of this Pentagon activity had reciprocal effects on the North side of the 
Potomac River as America’s diplomats struggled to conduct the business of international 
relations. 
At the Department of State, the picture included some rebuilding caused by the 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the logical redirection of resources dedicated to 
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation programs.  The arrival of retired General Colin L. 
Powell as Secretary of State was a gain for the prestige, influence and resources for his 
agency.  However, this was largely a pre-9/11 condition.  The progress of the Global War 
on Terror continues to define the George W. Bush Administration through unilateral 
military action with reciprocal consequences for diplomacy.  An additional complication 
for the Administration was the new Department of Homeland Security. 
The domestic picture had even less clarity with the inclusion of other factors like 
a razor-thin Republican majority in the U.S. Senate and only a manageable, but not 
dominating, Republican majority in the House of Representatives.  As previously noted, 
on the issue of modifying the ABM Treaty, there was little hope that any new Strategic 
Arms treaty could achieve Senate Ratification.  The Bush Administration can be assured  
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of the ability to advance its domestic and defense agendas as long as nothing appears, like 
an election set-back, to upset this delicate balance.  However, challenges existed beyond 
America’s borders. 
Like it or not, “…the United States needs to consider international reactions 
because other countries…can make the United States pay a strategic, military, and 
diplomatic price for building a missile defense.”47  In addition, the growing 
entanglements of commerce and trade cannot be ignored in any international action.  The 
U.S. missile defense effort requires the Bush administration to pay careful attention to not 
only the remaining threat states of Iran and North Korea, but also essentially friendly 
states like Japan, Russia, Great Britain, China, Pakistan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Israel, the collective Arab states, and the bulk of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Allies.  In short, there is no shortage of potential pitfalls in this endeavor. 
1. The Administration 
Deploying ballistic missile defenses provides the opportunity to study an 
American Administration adjusting on numerous levels.  The first term of the George W. 
Bush Administration became no easier with the decision to deploy missile defenses.  An 
already demanding political environment became more complex and challenging by 
terminating the ABM Treaty, redefining the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine, and 
the issues of a defense strategy focused on destroying an attacking ICBM.  Parallel to 
these pressures, the Bush Administration also faced the task of establishing the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Another significant factor within the expansive 
American military-industrial complex was Secretary Rumsfeld’s program to transform 
the U.S. Armed Forces.  Even while on the verge of deploying BMD, in some corners of 
the Pentagon, the focus remained on America’s offensive ICBM capabilities. 
The attention paid to BMD has offered some relief from public scrutiny to the 
ICBM forces in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy.  One related shift in the U.S. defense 
strategy is a de-emphasis of the role of America’s ICBMs.  Modernization plans for the 
next generation Trident or Minuteman missile are rarely debated in Congress or the 
media.  Earlier critics of NMD are finding their predictions of a new arms race unproven 
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and are observing an un-predicted effect of decreasing ICBM arsenals.  The most recent 
development in the arms control relationship between Russia and the U.S. is the prospect 
for a substantial reduction in their respective nuclear arsenals.48
In a continuation of a program approved by the former President George H. W. 
Bush in 1993, the U.S. Energy Department announced details of an eight-year plan to 
reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons by half.49  Lindsay and O’Hanlon advocated this 
action as a means to create savings to pay for the BMD effort over extended budget 
years.50
One example of this strategy in action is the complementary U.S. Navy program 
to redefine the roles and missions of the Trident SLBM Nuclear Submarines.  While 
some Trident submarines will continue their mission to provide the U.S. with a potent 
retaliation capability by prowling the world’s oceans virtually undetected, four vessels 
are now designated for conversion to carry conventionally armed Tomahawk Land 
Attack Cruise Missiles and a contingent of Special Operations Forces troops.51  In 
February 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz informed the House Budget 
Committee that the Navy effort to embrace transformation included the additional action 
of retiring 26 ships and 259 aircraft.52
In the same briefing, Mr. Wolfowitz announced that the USAF is already 
committed to retiring 114 fighter and 115 mobility/tanker aircraft.53  While this will free 
$21 Billion for transformation over the length of the multi-year defense program, a 
further reduction in the ICBM force through agreements with Russia is imminent.  This 
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presentation also defined the Air Force program with a decision to invest in people 
programs, modernization and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Even with gaining the National Guard GMD units, Mr. Wolfowitz detailed a long 
list of Army program sacrifices under the title of transformation.  Twenty-four systems 
were terminated to save $24 Billion over the six-year budget program.  This includes the 
Crusader artillery weapon, Bradley fighting vehicle and Abrams tank upgrades, and 
another 24 restructured equipment programs.  The Army is taking on a heavy load of 
change with the compensation being a prestigious, but lightly manned, BMD mission.   
Piled into this demanding scenario was the open acrimony between Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and the Army leadership of Secretary Thomas E. White and Chief of 
Staff General Eric K. Shinseki. 
The Spring of 2003 brought an unusual string of events.  Thomas E. White was 
forced to resign as Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld resorted to 
recalling retired General Peter J. Schoomaker to replace the retired Shinseki as Army 
Chief of Staff.  In another unprecedented move, Rumsfeld chose to nominate the sitting 
Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Roche, to take over the reigns at Army.  This was 
apparently undone by the impact of scandals at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and in the 
spring of 2004, Roche requested the withdrawal of his nomination to lead the Army. 
By the close of the summer of 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld had pushed the Army to 
a radical program that included the re-writing of Shinseki’s transformation plans.  This 
included discarding the long-standing service focus on army divisions in favor of smaller 
“battle groups”, and shifting the Army’s military personnel system away from individual 
career management and into a complete unit replacement personnel management 
program.54  By accomplishing an overall goal of changing army culture, Rumsfeld sought 
to remove the 10,000 plus soldier “divisions” that had been the focus of the army’s 
structure since World War I (for some historians, since the Civil War), and the current 
system of three to four year cycles of individual soldiers transferring in and out of units. 
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The challenges facing the Department of Defense are significant.  The Secretary 
of Defense, and perhaps the Commander in Chief, must pay close watch to military 
services while they are under this intense pressure to achieve transformation.  Conflict 
between the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to secure resources is still possible as 
military roles, missions, responsibilities and precious resources continue to fluctuate.  
Still, none of this specifically addresses the post-9/11 defense requirements of Homeland 
Security. 
Creating the Department of Homeland Security at the legislative level is likely to 
become the easy part of the process.  A more difficult question involves the coordination 
of defense policy and allocating resources between the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Pentagon.  Effectively allocating the Federal Government’s resources among the 
programs that provide security within America’s borders, and the transformation power-
projection forces sought by Secretary Rumsfeld is a significant task facing the Bush 
Administration. 
The list of first term actions of the George W. Bush Administration is lengthy.  
After emerging from the controversies over the election, whatever plans domestic plans 
that were in place were diverted by the 11 September 2001 tragedies.  In one analogy, it 
is possible to describe the Administration as juggling a multitude of difficult and 
contentious initiatives.  While this is not an impossible scenario for skilled administrative 
and political leaders, this does lend to a heightened risk of being undone through 
uncontrolled outside influences.  This then, turns attention to an influential group of 
American politicians working at the East end of Pennsylvania Avenue, on Capitol Hill. 
2. The U.S. Congress 
If there were a contest to name a foreign policy issue that just won’t go 
away, national missile defense would surely be a top contender.55
The strengths and motivations of the proponents and opponents of BMD in the 
U.S. Congress deserve the deliberate attention of the Administration, the military, and 
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BMD supporters in the private sector.  The steady march to demise for Nike-X, Sentinel, 
and finally Safeguard emphasizes the power of Congress to set policy through the control 
of the “purse strings” (the Federal budget).  Presumably, the supporters of BMD held 
thoughts of an advantage since 2001 began with a Republican President and GOP 
majorities in both the House and Senate.  Yet, recent history proves that even the one-
vote shift of power in the 2001 Senate posed a budgetary threat to the fiscal health of the 
MDA’s programs. 
The decision by Senator James Jeffords (Republican, New Hampshire) in 
February 2001 to renounce his GOP allegiance and declare himself an Independent 
shifted control of the Senate to the Democrats.  This raised the stature of NMD critic 
Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat, Delaware) as he returned to the position of Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  In May 2000, Senator Biden presented a 
critical evaluation of Department of Defense BMD proposals and pointed warnings of the 
international relations risk of an arms race in Asia as the consequence of BMD.56  The 
volatile addition of BMD to the tenuous relationships between the U.S., China, Taiwan, 
South Korea and North Korea is a concern presented in several forums in the following 
years.  Senator Biden utilized his brief return as Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman during 2001 to continue this pressure on the Administration during the 
progress towards the ABM Treaty abandonment and BMD deployment decision.57
Similar shifts of leadership and influence were apparent when the 2002 Defense 
Authorization Bill was reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee.  In early 
September 2001, majority Democrats had succeeded in removing $ 1.3 Billion from 
President Bush’s requested ballistic missile defense budget.  What could have become a 
major set-back for the Administration and the military was only overcome by 
unpredictable outside influences. 
Within days of the Senate Armed Services Committee vote cutting the BMD 
budget the terrorist use of four hijacked airliners changed America.  The personal and 
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political atmosphere on Capitol Hill following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
contributed to the restoration of the $1.3 Billion and laid the ground-work for funding 
growth in the 2003 and 2004 appropriations.  In the U.S. House of Representatives, BMD 
supports like Congressman Kurt Weldon (Republican, Pennsylvania) are certainly 
bolstered in their cause by the 2001 turn of events. A member of the House Armed 
Services Committee, this is how Mr. Weldon presented his stand as a BMD supporter. 
I have long been a proponent of a missile defense system that protects our 
citizens, troops overseas and allies from the ever-growing threat of an 
attack by missiles.  Within the past few years, rouge states across the 
globe have aggressively pursued and improved missile technology.  Most 
defense experts agree that unless we act quickly, we will find ourselves 
unable to protect against this type of attack.58
Previous centers of resistance to BMD are certainly only waiting for the next shift 
in majority control to see their position return to dominance.  As the calendar advances 
closer to the November 2004 National Election, the tides of the American electorate 
could turn against the Republicans.  If not in 2004, then the mid-term election in 2006 
provides an equally risky scenario.  Every two years the American political drama of 
“checks and balances” is played out at the Federal level.  The history of the U.S. BMD 
program has demonstrated on several occasions that neither the President, nor the 
Congress, can exercise absolute control over the process. 
During 2003 and 2004 the Department of Defense will pursue the shift of BMD 
from the research, development, test and evaluation of the previous 20 years, to an 
operational capability centered on the deployment of the GMD system operated by the 
National Guard in Alaska, California and Colorado.  Through the Congressional roles and 
authorities of oversight and budget appropriations, two questions will remain in close 
sight of the Members of Congress: rising Federal Budget deficits and doubts of the value 
of GMD. 
In its 2004 request, the Department of Defense proposed overall budget growth of 
2.5% each year through 2008.  This represents a $15.3 billion increase from 2003 to 
2004.  Still, administration officials have a valid argument that this is a small percentage 
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of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the total Federal Budget compared to 
expenditures during the Cold War years.59  This logical pretext will still fail to satisfy 
some members of Congress and fiscally sensitive influences throughout the country as 
the National Debt climbs towards a projected $6.8 trillion by 2014.60  The 7 September 
2004 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report included a projected $422 Billion 
Federal Budget deficit for 2004.  With a final 2005 Defense Appropriation of $447 
Billion and contentious projections of the future costs for Iraq and Afghanistan, the total 
deficit and Defense spending are perilously close in dollar amount and magnitude.61
Competing election year political interpretations have charged the budget debate.  
Bush Administration supporters point out that a 2004 deficit of $422 Billion is an 
improvement over both 2003 and earlier predictions.  This supports their contention of 
improved economic performance.  One key indicator used to support the Administration 
is that even this deficit figure is less than 3.6% of an $11 trillion national economy 
(GDP).  In contrast, during the Cold War Reagan years, Federal budget deficits were as 
high as 6% of GDP. 62
The Democratic Party opposition sought to gain an advantage through the 
message that even a reduction to a $422 Billion is not a proud achievement.  The 
potential for a long-term – structural – deficit raises the concerns of fiscal conservatives 
in both major parties.  Deficit spending critics remain concerned over the cumulative 
effects of compounded interest from annual borrowing, plus interest, and the necessity to 
repay Treasury bills. 
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One consistent factor in the pursuit of BMD is the debate over high cost.  
Pursuing emerging technologies and applying them to already deployed military systems 
is an inherently expensive process.  The decision to shift the missile defense program to 
parallel (or simultaneous) research – development - test and deployment is ambitious for 
the Administration.  However, only the good will and political support of the Congress 
can sustain the necessary funding. 
A much publicized May 2000 General Accounting Office (GAO) report presented 
a convincing cost figure of $36.2 billion.63  What sub-programs and linked programs are 
included in each budget projection seems to be the consistent variable.  Proponents tend 
to connect the fewest possible programs to arrive at a lower cost, while others will 
present figures with higher totals and impact.  In contrast, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) reached a $49 billion conclusion in April 2000 by adding the cost of 
Space-based sensors and other late program features not present in the GAO product.64  
Critics of BMD pile on with claims that adding the sea-based capabilities and next 
generation of space systems will boost the cost to over $120 billion.65
During the preparation of the Fiscal year 2005 Defense Budget GMD opponents 
attempted two attacks on the program.  The initial effort was a failed attempt to shift 
GMD funds to increase the manpower of the U.S. Army.  Building on a surge of popular 
support for soldiers fighting the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congresswoman Ellen 
Tauscher (Democrat, California) led the effort to pay for a permanent addition of 10,000 
troops to the U.S. Army at the cost of $1.6 Billion from GMD.66  Several months later, 
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Mrs. Tauscher urged the members of the House Armed Forces Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee to stop "…throwing money at a program from which we've seen no 
results."67  Her effort was voted down 8 to 6, and a $10.6 billion budget request 
advanced. 
Another significant opportunity for Congressional impact on BMD lies in the 
overall scope and ambition of Secretary Rumsfeld’s agenda.  The BMDS deployment 
decision exists in a complicated and treacherous environment when combined with five 
other Defense Department imperatives: the scope of the Global War on Terror, the 
growing insurgency in Iraq, U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan, transforming the 
military services, and Defense civilian workforce reforms.  In a singular analysis, each of 
these initiatives generates passionate support and opposition. In consideration of 
powerful interests from both inside and outside the Department of Defense, there are 
reasons to anticipate error and controversy. 
A seemingly unrelated misstep by a Department of Defense official working 
another controversial issue could easily carry-over to the detriment of BMD.  In an 
environment built on political advantage and disadvantage, even a minor error by the 
administration could play to the advantage of a Congressional opponent.  In the shadow 
of this uniquely American process of governing, a complementary debate continues over 
the ballistic missile threat and the formation and funding of the U.S. Defense policy. 
3. The Threat of Ballistic Missile and WMD Proliferation 
The proliferation of ICBM technology and the export of ballistic missiles are the 
disturbing realities of world political and defense policy.  Within the context of BMD, the 
proliferation of ballistic missile technologies outweighs any residual Cold-War pre-
occupation with the Russian or Chinese ICBM arsenals.  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) proliferation then adds the true terror and tragedy to the debate in addition to the 
scientific controversies of target acquisition, intercept tracking, and the reliability of hit-
to-kill technology. 
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Ballistic missile technology and WMD proliferation are the underlying sources of 
concern in the rogue nation ICBM attack scenarios that dominate the arguments to justify 
BMD.  Combining the two under the prospects of irrational international elements 
acquiring, or developing both, requires a distinct and separate defense strategy from the 
residual massive retaliation and deterrence that continues between the U.S., Russia and 
China.  The George W. Bush administration has been consistent in the assertion that a 
deployed GMD cannot, and is not intended to, defeat (an unlikely) deliberate ICBM 
attack from either Russia or China.  Still, these public pronouncements appear to have 
little effect on BMD critics who contend that GMD presents a risky provocation to those 
established nuclear powers.   
Those in opposition to the declared GMD deployment contend that there is no 
supportable threat that justifies this risk of erroneously provoking Russia or China into a 
ballistic missile launched nuclear attack.  In this line of thought, all crisis scenarios are 
greatly exaggerated from the view of either Russia or China through the existence of U.S. 
BMD.  The scope of a stereotypical Cold-War pre-emptive strike to defeat a perceived 
U.S. transgression grows to also eliminate the BMD capability.  For many, the stakes of 
the game of nuclear balance and counter-balance are intolerable with the added element 
of BMD.  Here lies a nearly intractable point of contention as a U.S. domestic viewpoint, 
and as an issue of international concern. 
Balancing the concerns of international allies in the context of BMD as a 
provocation, or as a limited defensive capability places extreme pressure on both the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense.  While State delivers the positive 
message, Defense must take care to allow no action that counters the limited defense 
pronouncements.  This is a delicate matter as long as the GMD range-fan appears to 
block only the ICBM flight-path from North Korea.  The stakes are higher as the BMD 
protective perimeter expands and the perception grows that the U.S. may be pursuing 
invulnerability to any ICBM attack.  Yet, proliferation implies that such a shield from all 
sides is both prudent and necessary. 
The U.S. Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Air Force provide a comparison of 
ballistic missile proliferation between 1972 (Figure 1) and 2001 (Figure 2).  Each lacks 
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mention of the final member of the group, the United States.  Regardless, the 
international political and defense relations relevant to a world of nine sovereign 
governments holding ballistic missile capability in 1972 is a severe contrast to 28 in 
2001.  The implications of missile technology and WMD proliferation to terrorist, or 
criminal, entities further complicates the ballistic missile defense picture. 
A great body of material discusses the rational versus irrational, or sovereign 
government versus rogue and the influence of deterrence.  In 1997, Richard Utecht 
concluded his U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project with this statement, 
“The rational planner must therefore conclude that a National Missile Defense system is 
the sane alternative to an irrational national actor or terrorist who has the will (to use 
ballistic missiles) to launch a nuclear, biological or chemical conflagration.”68  Recent 
reports detail the increasing availability of ICBM technology throughout the world.  
Availability, coupled with resources and fanatical dedication to the cause of harming the 
U.S., or its allies, moves the prospect for ballistic missile attack from the category of 
Cold War remnant to 21st Century threat. 
As the former bi-polar arsenals of the U.S. and Russia reduce, this study offers 
one view of multi-lateral ballistic missile, and potentially WMD, expansion in all corners 
of the globe.  Where deterrence and retaliation held to prevent world annihilation though-
out the Cold-War, it may be too great an assumption to believe that the same policies will 
overcome the temptation for WMD attack by less rational holders of ballistic missiles in 
the future.  Assurances of low accuracy and minimal numbers in an irrational attack are 
irrelevant when compared to the realization of the catastrophic results of failing to defeat 
even a clumsy WMD attack.  The complexity of preparing against attacks from multiple 
fronts gives credence to the cause of BMD. 
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Figure 1.   Countries With Ballistic Missile Capability –1972 
The bi-polar nature of political and defense relationships in 1972 simplifies the 
picture through a quick grouping of these nations into China, NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact.  Adding the impacts of influences exercised by the Cold War Superpower political 
pressures leads to an understanding that this was a tense, but controlled situation.  The 
same level of confidence does not apply to the post 2001 situation. 
 
Figure 2.   Countries With Missile Capability - 2001 
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The danger of ballistic missile conflict rises exponentially between 1972 and 
2001.  While the Cold War adversarial environment nearly polarized the world into two 
antagonistic camps, this new environment counts numerous points of contention.  
Amazingly, the continued existence of nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia is 
a constant, along with anxiety over the nuclear ICBM capabilities of China.  Restraint 
from France and the United Kingdom is an equal constant.  In the case of a few countries, 
the presence of TBMs and ICBMs is a remnant of the Cold War, and not necessarily a 
contemporary danger.  
Prime candidates for this conclusion are the former Warsaw Pact (and detached 
USSR) nations who have more to gain from selling their missiles and warheads to third 
countries, or terrorist elements, than through the more acceptable U.S. funded non-
proliferation programs like the Nunn-Lugar Act.  This group of eight includes Belarus, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Poland, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, and the 
Ukraine.  As more of these former Soviet satellites shift their allegiances to NATO, the 
threat of both their existing missiles, and missile technologies, recedes.  The remaining 
16 missile powers hold varying degrees of assurance and concern. 
In the decades since the Camp David Accord it is unlikely that Egyptian SCUD-
Bs pose any threat to Israel.  Lacking regime change in Cairo that turns hostile to the 
U.S., the comparative tranquility of that border appears secure.  Most surprisingly, Libya 
appears to have abandoned the path of rogue nation.  The recent acquiescence of the 
Qadhafi regime to world pressure continues to receive mixed reviews.  The progression 
from Axis of Evil member to Mr. Qadhafi touring the capitals of Europe portends to 
reduce the threat of technology proliferation.  Similarly, it is equally safe to place the 
missile forces of the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein into the no-threat column.  
Moderate risk continues to exist in the Middle East. 
Israel’s denied, but globally accepted, possession of both nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles amidst antagonistic neighbors justifies deliberate efforts in diplomacy 
and deterrence.  The restraint exercised by Israel during the first Iraq war is a difficult 
status quo to sustain.  Still, this serves as an example of a tense situation that could 
provoke a wider, international, conflict.  The sole remaining member of the Axis of Evil, 
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Iran, stands with Syria as the focus of concern for ballistic missile aggression.  To a lesser 
extent, the security and controls over the arsenals of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United 
Arab Emirates also deserve U.S. and world attention.  This is not from the point of 
concern over deliberate launch by their governments, but from the aspect of those 
weapons falling under the control of more unpredictable and radical influences. 
Perhaps the critical flashpoint lays to the East of the Persian Gulf, where the 
continuing disputes over the borders of Kashmir raise the issue of nuclear conflict that 
could ensnarl India, Pakistan and China.  The attention paid to the growth of nuclear and 
ballistic missile technologies by India and Pakistan has nearly over-shadowed the U.S. 
development of BMD.  With each flashpoint incident of belligerent exchanges of “test 
launches” there is no shortage of anxiety to when these technological events will turn 
deadly.  It is within reason then to believe that some creative minds at the Pentagon, or 
Langley, Virginia, are analyzing how effective a U.S. developed BMD system would fare 
against a Shaheen II or Agni II.  Of greater concern is anticipating the next action or 
reaction by China to the presence of these weapons along its Southern border. 
China watchers continue to cover the entire spectrum of defense and diplomatic 
predictions.  In his approval of the Safeguard deployment in 1969, President Richard 
Nixon gave the assurance that the limited capability based on North Dakota could defend 
the U.S. against Chinese missiles through the 1970s.69  The current Administration 
maintains that their Chinese counterparts can have full confidence in the viability of their 
nuclear ICBM deterrent as the American BMD deployment is so modest to only claim a 
capability against small scale, or accidental, launches.  However, this does not account 
for the implications of expanding that American protection to Japan, South Korea or 
Taiwan.  China’s potential issues over U.S. actions connected to BMD deployment may 
not be unique. 
A consistent element in the American decision to deploy BMD is the threat of 
ICBM attack from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea.  
The latest U.S. Presidential directive on BMD serves to “counter enemies around the 
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world who try to use long-range missiles as tools of extortion and aggression.”70  
Although this has broad application in a world of expanding WMD and ballistic missile 
threats, there is little doubt that the primary focus of BMD remains North Korea.  The 
unmatched belligerence of the Pyong-Yang regime serves as the reason for much of the 
language in this most recent U.S. declaration. 
We must devalue missiles as tools of extortion and aggression, the policy 
says, undermining the confidence of our adversaries that threatening 
missile attack would succeed in blackmailing us.  In this way, although  
missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive response 
capability, they are an added and critical dimension of contemporary 
deterrence.71
Although the North Korean ICBM threat continues to lead administration 
arguments for the deployment of BMD, others maintain that the North Korean missile 
program is more likely a foreign trade resource, and arguable legitimate deterrent to a 
potential U.S. ICBM attack in a South Korea defense scenario.72  Considerable effort is 
needed from the Bush Administration to avoid a return to catastrophic conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula.  Both the Department of State and Defense Department hold key roles 
and responsibilities in maintaining the peace and not succumbing to further North Korean 
threats, aggressive posturing and attempts at coercion through the exploitation of ballistic 
missile and nuclear technology. 
The North Korean regime of Kim Jung Il has the most to lose from a successful 
U.S. BMD deployment.  The balance between the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and 
North Korea already suffers from the effects of the 1998 Taepo-Dong test launch, covert 
nuclear programs, the truce on the Korean Peninsula, and continuous famine north of the 
38th parallel.  Faced with doubts on the survival of his regime, the deployment of BMD 
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raises dire predictions of Kim Jung Il’s reaction.73  As the understood focal point of the 
American BMD program, understanding the capabilities and tendencies of the Pyong 
Yang government is of paramount concern.  As much as world attention falls on North 
Korea there are some who hold issue with the United States.  As the Administration and 
Congress deliberate on the content and funding to conduct U.S. Defense and Foreign 
policy, it is necessary to consider the nations around the world who comprise America’s 
allies, and others, who might seek to influence the decision-making in Washington, D.C. 
4. U.S. Relations with the Global Community 
Beyond the American borders currently specified for protection by BMD exists an 
additional population of influential and powerful nations with the capability to either help 
or hinder the U.S. program of ballistic missile defense.  The influences of friendly 
nations, declared allies, known threats, potential problems, and the expanding unknowns 
of International Relations in the new millennium continually add new complexities.  In 
the admitted age of globalization, the George W. Bush Administration has been criticized 
for acting in apparent disregard of the interests and will of other nations.  Administration 
supporters maintain that American unilateralism led to the success of the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  The same achievements may not translate well into the program to 
deploy GMD. 
Securing the goodwill of foreign governments appears integral to the latest Bush 
Administration shift to the concept of “Global Missile Defense.”  This evolution of the 
earlier National Missile Defense program acknowledges the international enablers of the 
program, and moves building systems for the protection of deployed American forces to a 
less prominent level.  Without reducing the systems to protect American soldiers and 
allies, the Bush Administration expanded the beneficial reach of the overall BMDS. 
A consistent theme of the Administration program has been to offer protection 
from ballistic missile attacks to friends and allies through the development and sharing of 
anti-ICBM technology.  Russia’s agreement to allow the demise of the ABM Treaty 
simplified the process to proceed to missile defense deployment, and opened the potential 
for Russian military planners to learn the intricacies of the American BMDS.  While 
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controversial, this Russian access to U.S. technology is only one issue with the expanded 
BMDS umbrella of protection. 
What raises issues of debate are conflicting interpretations of the secondary 
effects of another nation providing support to the American program, or actually hosting 
the deployment of BMDS.  Senator Biden summarized the thoughts of those who remain 
skeptical of this in May of 2000. 
My own view is that the risk of a nuclear arms race in Asia would be the 
most dangerous consequence of deploying a national missile defense that 
was not limited to defending against the missiles of specific target states.  I 
fear that such an arms race would be terribly costly and would destabilize 
China’s relations with its neighbors, and that the resulting instability 
would lead to Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea building nuclear weapons.   
They have the capability to do that, and I truly believe they might, if an 
Asian arms race were to occur as a result of our missile defense 
deployment.74
The New York Times Editorial Board again voiced dire consequences for 
extending the BMD shield to Asia in April 2004.  On the eve of a visit to the region by 
Vice President Dick Cheney, the newspaper published a strongly worded caution against 
antagonizing China and/or Pakistan by excluding them from a shield over Japan and 
Taiwan.  These observers contend that diplomatic pressure from a united China and 
America promises greater security than a technologically unproven missile defense.75  
This critical stance defies the opposing viewpoint that deterrence alone is ineffective 
against irrational players. 
The concerns of other nations with regard to U.S. Defense policies and programs 
are linked to the progressing doctrine of the pre-emptive use of military force, and the 
potential for increased freedom of action from the new-found security of an America 
protected from small-scale ICBM attack.  Raymond E. Franck, Jr., and Francois Melese 
make one explanation of this issue.  In their 2002 collaboration, they offer an intriguing 
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scenario analysis of a United States emboldened to intervene in third-party conflicts.  
They hypothesize that U.S. decision makers are more likely to commit forces to even a 
nuclear ICBM conflict, when the risks of such weapons striking U.S. territory are reduced 
or non-existent.76  This is consistent with the observation by Michael Simon that the 
combination of BMD and the “Powell Doctrine” leads to a pre-eminent U.S. military that 
is more inclined to intervene in regional conflicts.77
Adding the tactical success of the U.S. military in the opening months of 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” and there is now a four-part formula: conventional military 
dominance, willingness to take pre-emptive action, the Powell Doctrine (the American 
use of overwhelming force to secure or achieve defined national interests), and lowered 
concerns over potential ICBM attack against the American Homeland.  Figure 3 presents 
these four “pillars” of a new American defense and foreign policy strategy. 
 The national interests of the United States provide a base of support to four 
pillars of this new Acropolis roof that depicts the potential for a new era of international 
relations dominated by military imperatives.  The concepts represented by the pillars are 
certainly not minor influences on the decision-making processes of the George W. Bush 
Administration.  From the viewpoint of world leaders outside the United States, this 
becomes a matter of significant concern.  Is the world safer with a United States capable 
of deciding issues of national interest using those four foundational concepts? 
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Figure 3.   The 21st Century American Military Strategy 
 
According to Jeffrey Larsen and James Wirtz, this is the focus of the tensions 
surrounding BMD deployment in international relations, particularly in Asia.78  The 
actions and reactions to the pending American BMD deployment from the perspectives of 
the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, Japan, India and Pakistan deserve high attention 
throughout several sectors of the Bush Administration.  A proliferation of crises on 
diplomatic, military and economic levels in the broader Pacific Rim may prove more 
detrimental to American national interests than a North Korean ICBM program that 
“stays in the barn” except as an inspiration for bellicose rhetoric. 
The focus of American restraint starts with the realization that an impenetrable 
BMD capability removes the deterrence of nuclear retaliation.  America can become 
neither a world police force, nor an international bully, because of an operational BMDS.  
Achieving positive alternatives to either worst-case scenario is a high charge for any 
American administration. 
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However, the world may in-fact enjoy a heightened sense of security.  With BMD 
deployed, the possession of a nuclear capable ICBM is no longer an international 
relations “Ace of Spades” that can overpower more rational and deliberative processes.  
Effective BMD can conceivably counter irresponsible behavior by both minor and major 
nuclear powers.  Similarly, proliferation is likely to decline as “…rogue states are 
particularly susceptible to the power of BMD, and will not acquire nuclear weapons if 
BMD is deployed.”79  In the same spirit, a deployed BMD is useful to counter another 
aspect of rogue state nuclear and ICBM technology. 
…weak nations want long-range missiles not only because they can serve 
as operational weapons of war, and help assure regime survival in such a 
war, but also because their very presence makes them useful for coercive 
diplomacy.80
Removing these “blackmail” elements from the conduct of international relations 
is universally desirable.  In that manner, an operational and deployed U.S. BMD 
complements a strategy that includes prevention, preemption and deterrence.81  Keeping 
the broadest range of options open and viable to U.S. diplomats sustains an international 
environment that is more conducive to economic than to military actions.  Defusing any 
crisis containing elements of nuclear or ICBM blackmail is a positive capability. 
Following the BMD deployment decision the Bush administration has seen a 
shifting of international perceptions and perceived acceptance.  Great Britain has 
responded favorably to technical changes to a radar facility on its territory.  Moreover, a 
senior British political leader has publicly declared a need to protect British citizens from 
ICBM attack.82  Similarly, changes at the Thule, Greenland radar site seem to require 
only an economic assurance from the U.S. to gain Danish agreement, and some measure 
of local approval.83  At the opposite side of the globe, the psychological victim of North 
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Korea’s 1998 TAE-PO DONG over-flight, Japan, has also moved closer to this new U.S. 
defensive posture.84
The question arises on where the Department of Defense, Department of 
Homeland Security, and Justice Department draw lines of demarcation and establish 
effective coordination on the issue of unconventional threats.  Criticism is never far on 
this topic, largely rising from doubts that these three agencies can succeed in sharing 
critical intelligence and actually preventing another 9-11-01 attack, rather than only 
reaching the point of reaction and clean-up.  Lindsay and O’Hanlon offer this sobering 
point of view. 
No NMD system will protect Americans against nuclear suitcase 
bombs…nor will a system address the threat from governments or 
terrorists using ship or possibly even the territory of nearby countries to 
launch cruise missiles or shorter-range ballistic missiles at the United 
States.85
To this end, the Bush Administration is pursuing a two-pronged approach to non-
proliferation.86  In addition to continuing the Nunn-Lugar program to pay the costs of 
nuclear disarmament and security in the nations of the former Warsaw Pact, the Bush 
program added the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003.  However, the 
description and record of PSI appear to defy traditional characteristics of a significant 
Presidential initiative. 
According to Pentagon director of negotiations policy, Guy Roberts, "There is no 
secretariat, there is no building, there is no office called PSI."87  He further stated that the 
2005 defense budget request would not include a specific line item for PSI.  Despite the 
recent  success  intercepting  Libyan  nuclear weapons related materials, there is concern  
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over continuing PSI as a decentralized program.  In contrast to the Department of 
Defense plan of using three international working groups to direct PSI, two outside 
observers raise some issues. 
At the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Clay Moltz, advocates 
PSI funding for international exercises or counter-proliferation efforts.  On the subject of 
a DOD PSI manager Moltz says, "It would be helpful to have a coordinator for PSI 
activities; to have a small office."88
In a similar tone, the president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control 
Institute, Michael Moodie, believes that PSI will succeed, but at the cost of sacrifices in 
other DOD areas.  Mr. Moodie questions the priority given to PSI and other efforts in a 
very complex area.  He said, "…the corollary is that something else on which they work 
will get less attention."89
C. SUMMARY 
Arriving at a decision on Defense Policy in the government of the United States 
of America is rarely a simple and straight-forward process.  In the case of ballistic missile 
defenses there are a myriad of influencing and conflicting considerations. 
The turn of the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Centuries has provided little relief 
and actually a great deal of complication.  The practical work within the checks-and-
balances of the American Federal Government presents the advocates and adversaries of 
BMD with obstacles and opportunities. 
On the international level, relations with nation-states has been further 
complicated by the extra-national players often given the title terrorists.  American efforts 
at non-proliferation, diplomacy, and on-going military intervention, comprise the strategy 
to deal effectively with this concern. 
Amid all these great and powerful efforts a small group of National Guard citizen-
soldiers prepare to make the BMD program an operational reality.  The next chapter 
examines their legacy and promise to ensure the future of their nation. 
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III. ROLES, MISSIONS, AND STRUCTURE 
A. NATIONAL GUARD PRECEDENTS 
Civil-Military relationships in America are challenged in the 21st Century to 
resolve an inherent conflict between two competing ideals: the founding concept of a 
militia (National Guard) based defense and the Cold War legacy of a military dominated 
by a substantial standing active duty force.  In the course of studying the U.S. pursuit of a 
ballistic missile defense system between the years 2000 and 2004, inextricable linkage is 
found to a rather bold initiative from almost fifty years earlier. 
Beginning with a single test unit, the U.S. Army rapidly expanded a program of 
National Guard units performing operational missions to counter the perceived threat of 
long-range Soviet bombers capable of attacking the United States.  As this shared mission 
moved through the late Fifties, Sixties and early Seventies, a similar concept was part of 
the initial planning for the emerging ballistic missile defense program. 
With the commitment of thousands of National Guard citizen-soldiers manning 
dozens of defensive sites throughout the Continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii a 
tradition and record of excellence was established.  More than twenty years after closing 
the last National Guard Nike Hercules site, the U.S. Army chose to return to the source of 
that record and entrust the National Guard with the mission to establish a similar level of 
professionalism, pride and performance to finally reach the nearly half-century goal of 
defeating an attacking ballistic missile. 
1. A Foundation Set for Success 
In the early 1950s, the military bases and major cities of the United States 
appeared vulnerable to nuclear attack by the strategic bomber forces of the Soviet Union.  
Achieving an acceptable stand off distance to defeat nuclear weapons capable bombers 
was the challenge facing the U.S. military.  Within the context of this threat, two areas 
require focused analysis.  First, that the National Guard performed an operational defense 
mission as well as the active Army, and second, that success in this nuclear armed 
mission infers a great level of confidence in the current members of the National Guard 
to perform the non-nuclear Ground-based Midcourse Defense mission. 
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Memories of the London Blitz were fresh and vivid in the late 1940s and 1950s.  
This was after-all, the era of the backyard bomb-shelter and air raid drills in American 
elementary schools.  Preventing the increased terror of nuclear bombardment of 
American cities was a key responsibility of the U.S. military.  After a short time relying 
on World-War II era anti-aircraft cannons, the U.S. Army began deploying the 25-mile 
range Nike Ajax missile system around major American cities, military bases and 
industrial centers. 
In a few short years, the Army combined this technology with an organizational 
innovation; share this mission with the part-time, militia heritage, National Guard.  
Between 1951 and 1957, the Army called upon numerous National Guard Air Defense 
Artillery units to operate their nearly antiquated 90-millimeter, or 120-millimeter, guns in 
this cause, while active units re-organized around the Nike missiles.  This balanced gun-
SAM (surface to air missile) concept formed the foundation while the Army staff, the 
National Guard, and the Adjutant’s General of those states vulnerable to attack developed 
ambitious plans to place Nike missiles under the control of citizen-soldiers.90
The operational pattern that emerged under this program began with the National 
Guard manning the old Air Defense Artillery (ADA) gun sites, while the active Army 
established the Nike Ajax capability.  This developed in later years into a consistent 
pattern of the National Guard becoming the on-site replacement for active Army units, 
first at Nike Ajax and then at Nike Hercules defensive sites. 
On 25 March 1954, a National Guard ADA gun unit joined the defensive 
perimeter around New York City.  At the high point, before beginning the transition to 
Nike missiles, there were 105 National Guard ADA gun units in 14 states and the District 
of Columbia manned by a full-time staff of 1,759 with a back-up force of tens of 
thousands more traditional National Guard members.91  Under the title of Special 
Security Force, or SSF, these units operated subject to the policies and procedures of 
active Army special directives and rigorous inspections. 
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…a DA (Department of the Army) inspection of the ARNG (Army 
National Guard) program found, in 1957, that on-site SSF units were 
“capable of performing their assigned mission.”  The 15 man battery 
teams of full-time technicians – nuclei from which greater things were 
soon to grow – had displayed in this inspection “a high degree of training 
and ability.”  The basic concepts of the on-site and SSF programs were 
found to be “sound” not only in terms of “economy in manpower and 
financial resources,” but of “operational effectiveness.”92
In addition to evaluations that assessed the training and mission readiness of the 
National Guard units, there is also the record of a financial survey that identified 
significant cost savings.93  Under the headings of initial and annual operating costs, it 
found that the National Guard units required approximately $1.9 million less in each 
category.  More significantly, the Frazer Board arrived at a standardization conclusion of 
15 full time National Guard technicians at each ADA gun unit site in order to achieve the 
goal of a minimum of three soldiers on site at all times. 
The development of this full-time and traditional mix of National Guard members 
during the 1951 to 1957 period lays the foundation for success throughout the following 
decades.  Beginning in the gun era, and continuing through the Nike Hercules units, the 
National Guard ADA units organized with same number of soldiers as the active Army.  
Other National Guard units carried a lower percentage of personnel on their rosters than 
an equivalent active Army organization. 
With the number of available soldiers at equal levels, the question arose of how a 
part-time National Guard unit could organize itself to perform the Nike mission the same 
as full-time active army units.  Innovation was required in the face of the perception of 
active soldiers being on duty 365 days each year in contrast to the National Guard model 
of “…a total of 48 armory drill periods of two hours each; six eight-hour days, or three 
weekends; and 15 days of annual field training.”94
Unless called to the ADA gun site for an attack alert the vast majority of a 
National Guard unit was on duty only these few hours and days each year.  Even the 15 
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full-time National Guardsmen, while drilling members of the unit, came to work during 
the week through a civilian hiring program administered by the States and National 
Guard Bureau, using Department of the Army funding.95  This was the beginning of the 
Federally funded dual-status system that would provide a viable full-time workforce for 
the National Guard Nike units. 
The National Guard experience remained essentially unchanged; citizen in peace, 
and soldier in war.  During peacetime, this person is a member of the local community 
whose primary employment is in the local factory, as a teacher, or in some other 
profession.  As a volunteer, this citizen performs duty as required as a member of their 
local National Guard unit.  The significant difference that arose from the Nike program 
was the presence of a significant number of unit members who performed their military 
duties, in uniform, in a full-time employment program paid according to the Federal Civil 
Service system.  As the program changed from guns to missiles, the number of dual-
status citizen-soldiers expanded from 15 per unit to nearly two-hundred. 
2. Missile-Age Minutemen 
General Maxwell D. Taylor had an extensive record of interaction with the 
National Guard in the Air Defense mission between 1951 and 1958.  He was the U.S. 
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration during critical meetings 
to approve numerous aspects of the National Guard mission during the gun era.  In 1958, 
as Army Chief of Staff, he made this address a few weeks after the California National 
Guard’s 720th Missile Battalion replaced an active Army unit at a Nike Ajax site.96
The Guard has recently passed another milestone in its service to national 
defense. Two weeks ago, the first National Guard air defense battalion to 
take over the full-time operation of NIKE missile sites went on station in 
the vicinity of Los Angeles. The Army is most anxious to exploit the 
capabilities of the Guard to a maximum in this particular field. We 
recognize that the assignment of National Guard units to NIKE sites must 
be done on a selective basis, taking into account necessary levels of 
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readiness as well as geographical location in reference to population 
centers and availability of equipment. I anticipate that our experience with 
this pilot unit in the Los Angeles area will guide us in determining the 
future metes and bounds of this important program. 
Over the next sixteen years National Guard citizen-soldiers operated Nike battery 
and battalion size units throughout the Continental United States and Hawaii.  "In doing 
so, the Guard itself…spanned the same weapons system as the active Army, moving, in 
less than a decade, from a gun system that shot 25 pound projectiles up to 36,000 feet 
onward to a nuclear-tipped missile system that reaches an ionospheric ceiling more than 
30 miles high."97  The tradition of the Colonial militia, and the Minutemen who 
responded at Lexington and Concord had reached a new level of sophistication and 
lethality.  Muskets and flintlocks had progressed to the 300-lb high explosive warhead of 
a Nike Ajax missile, and then to the nuclear or conventional high explosive warhead 
selection available on the Nike Hercules.98
On a day-to-day basis the 720th Missile Battalion, and dozens of units that 
followed the same path, were under the command of their State Adjutant General and the 
operational control of the Army commander of the (local) antiaircraft defense.99  Key to 
this relationship was the firing policy. 
National Guard AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery) Commanders, while in their 
State status, may fire defense weapons at aircraft in consonance with the 
information, intelligence, and operational concepts provided by the Active 
Army air defense commanders.100
Realizing that the life span of the gun units was at an end, the National Guard 
prepared the 720th with great seriousness and a broad scope of effort.  The California 
National Guard chain of command searched through the 720th and two sister units to find 
the best available personnel.  A new commander led the 720th, “…a veteran of World 
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War II and 19 years’ service with the Guard, as well as a graduate of Army Schools up to 
and including the Command and General Staff College.”101  This was Lieutenant Colonel 
Julian A. Phillipson’s third, but arguably most important and demanding, command.  
Like all of his battery commanders, Lt. Col. Phillipson had the dual role of employment 
as one of the full-time supervisory civilian technicians.  Out of 465 total members of the 
720th, 191 were employed in the full-time technician program.102
To meet the requirements for round-the-clock preparedness, fifteen Guard 
technicians manned each battery-sized site on a full-time basis.  Upon 
alert, all members of the unit reported directly to their battle stations from 
homes and work places.  Not since the colonial minutemen had 
Guardsmen been called upon to make such a sudden transition from peace 
to war.103
Throughout the month of June 1957, the National Guard soldiers trained side-by-
side with the active Army 865th Missile Battalion at the Nike Ajax sites the 720th would 
take over control.  Simultaneously, groups of 720th soldiers traveled to the active Army 
Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, and completed package training by 23 
July 1957.  Before the actual activation in September 1958, the cooperative efforts of the 
members of the 720th and 865th resulted in adjustments to the alert structure and the full-
time personnel design. 
Within the design of a battalion headquarters and four firing batteries (A, B, C 
and D) the 720th was originally given the requirement to keep two batteries on a 30-
minute response alert status, and the others on a 3-hour alert.  The first variation changed 
this to one 15-minute alert battery, and three on 3-hour alert.  In addition to increasing the 
battalion commander’s staff to reach a new total technician strength of 202, the 720th 
developed procedures that kept three, rather than the planned two, missile launching 
sections per battery manned during the 30-minute alert periods.  During a demanding 5-
month period, the 720th advanced from unsatisfactory missile crew performances to the 
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October 1958 rating of three operational batteries and the fourth deficient only due to 
equipment failure.104  Throughout the trials of the 720th, the Department of the Army 
was already at the decision point to expand the number of National Guard Nike Ajax 
units. 
The scope and speed of the DA program to convert National Guard gun units to 
Nike Ajax was unprecedented.  Even before the soldiers of the 720th had completed their 
initial training, DA notified the Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) that 
“…approximately 26 National Guard gun battalions are programmed for conversion to 
Nike Ajax during FY (fiscal year) (19)60.”105  Despite the DA Policy Directive published 
on 26 December 1957, the details of the conversion experienced great fluctuation until 
1963 with the advent of the first National Guard Nike Hercules units. 
A rapidly evolving DA plan moved the National Guard from 88 batteries, to 58, 
and then an indication of 76 by 1961.  Beginning with the four firing batteries of the 
720th, the National Guard Nike Ajax mission grew to 52 batteries in 1960, 76 in 1961, 
and then declined to 69 in 1962 and 34 in 1963.  In that year, the Army completed the 
retirement of Nike Ajax missiles and began turning over Nike Hercules sites to National 
Guard units.106  This peak year is reflected in a total number of 4,976 National Guard 
technicians between 34 Nike Ajax and the first 16 Nike Hercules units in the Continental 
U.S., and six National Guard Nike Hercules firing units in Hawaii.107
Several factors contributed to the U.S. Army’s rapid acceptance and expansion of 
National Guard participation in the Nike Hercules mission.  Between 1960 and 1961 the 
influence of the expanding Vietnam conflict, the technological advance to Nike Hercules, 
and the positive early results of National Guard Nike Ajax assignments motivated the 
Department of the Army staff to look to the National Guard to man Nike Hercules.108
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The case of the Hawaii air defense structure was one catalyst to this change.  In 
contrast to the structure in the continental United States where both active Army and 
National Guard units were present, the defense of the nation’s newest state was entirely 
National Guard.109  The result of these factors was the conversion of National Guard 
Nike Ajax units to Nike Hercules, and a corresponding decrease in active Army 
participation through 1974.  Table 2 – Nike Firing Units and Personnel, provides a 
summary of this history.  The table begins with National Guard (NG) participation in 
1959, although the active Army (AA) had established Nike Ajax units starting in 1954 
with five(5) battalions and 32, 171 personnel. 
 
Table 2.   Nike Firing Units and Personnel 















1959 202 4 42 30,480 2,312  
1960 122 52 88 34,904 3,774  
1961 56 76 114 6* 30,850 4,252  
1962  69 130 6* 24,830 4,396  
1963  34 118 16 23,044 4,976  
1964   98 42 20,716 7,727 4,795 28,443 
1965   82 54 20,498 7,727 5,027 28,225 
1966   64 54 16,406 7,727 4,970 24,133 
1967   64 54 16,487 7,727 5,043 24,214 
1968   64 54 15,782 7,105 5,128 22,887 
1969   43/41 46 12,223 6,538 4,742 18,761 
1970   38 38 11,152 6,075 3,613 17,227 
1971   38 27 11,152 6,075 2,667 17,227 
1972   38 27 11,152 6,075 2,707 17,227 
1973   25 27 8,069 4,473 2,670 12,542 
1974   1,620  
Data combined from ARGUS magazine, June 1974, page 20, and 
The Army National Guard in Air Defense 1951-1974, pages 87 and 89.  
*National Guard Hercules in 1961-62 is the Hawaii defense.  National 
Guard military strength in Nike units (traditional members) before 1964 is 
not available. 
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From 1961 to 1974 National Guard citizen-soldiers in 17 states operated first the 
conventional munition and liquid fueled Nike Ajax, and then the solid rocket and nuclear 
warhead capable Nike Hercules.  The prospects of mixing JP-4 jet fuel with red fuming 
nitric acid (UDMH) contained enough risk during the Ajax era that veteran Nike 
crewmen welcomed the advance to Hercules.110  However, controversy exists in some 
contemporary settings on the truth of the U.S. Army entrusting Nike Hercules nuclear 
warheads to the National Guard.  As recently as September 2003, the staff of the U.S. 
Army Air Defense Artillery Museum at Fort Bliss, Texas, was certain that the National 
Guard Nike Hercules units were not allowed nuclear warheads.111  In truth, this was a 
minor distinction between legal custody of the warheads, and the mission, responsibility 
and authorization to launch them against an attacker. 
3. Nuclear Minutemen 
The Department of the Army on 5 March 1962 published “Policies for National 
Guard Participation in CONUS Air Defense”.  Four years of experience with National 
Guard Nike Ajax had produced a definitive guide for the conduct of the nuclear capable 
mission.112  Clear definitions of responsibilities and authorities for the nuclear warheads 
highlighted the policy. 
State authorities agreed to provided site safety and local security according to 
standards set by the Department of the Army, the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command, and the Army Air Defense Command “…as desired by the Active Army air 
defense commander.”  In turn, the ARADCOM commanders agreed to provide 
appropriate support to the Nike units, counter intelligence information to aid in site 
security, and operated the system that kept legal custody of the nuclear warheads in 
active Army hands. 113  The final step was for the local air defense commanders to 
 
110 Interviews with Sergeant (Retired) Ron Parro and Lt. Col. (Retired) John Gordon “GORDO” Lunn 
at Nike Site SF-88L, Gold Gate National Recreation Area, 17 April 2003.  Interview with Brigadier 
General (Retired) Neil E. Allgood, Long Beach, California, 15 September 2003. 
111 Interviews and research conducted by the author from 17-19 September 2003. 
112 Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, The Army National Guard in Air 
Defense 1951-1974.  Pages 81-82.  Washington, D.C., January 1975. 
113 Ibid, page 82.  Also, Department of the Army Policy dated 29 December 1961.  Copy obtained 
form the personal library of Brigadier General (Retired) Neil E. Allgood, Long Beach, California, 15 
September 2003. 
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establish custodial teams to control the release of the nuclear warhead arming devices.  
Only two conditions allowed for that final action.114
This information is supported by the unsolicited oral history of the National 
Guard experience presented by former Nike Hercules commanders Major General 
(Retired) John R. “Jack” D’Araujo (Hawaii), and Major General (Retired) David W. Gay 
(Connecticut), in June 2001.  During a gathering of U.S. Army, National Guard Bureau 
and interested National Guard State-level authorities both D’Araujo and Gay discounted 
the excitement over “National Missile Defense” in 2001.  In General D’Araujo’s words, 
“…after all, in those days our missiles had Nukes!”115   
Brigadier General (Retired) Neil E. Allgood provided more specific descriptions 
from his historic tenure as the Commander of the 720th Missile Battalion (eventually re-
titled the 4th Missile Battalion 251st Artillery).  According to General Allgood, two 
noncommissioned officers from the local active Army air defense command supported 
each Hercules battery.  While the un-armed warheads would lie in substantially protected 
bunkers, they could only be armed following the arrival of these two sergeants and the 
removal of firing devices from on-site high security safes.  In the case of the Hawaii 
defense, General D’Aurajo was clear in his message that nothing could have prevented 
one of the National Guard batteries from firing a Hercules missile with a nuclear round if 
the islands fell under Soviet bomber attack. 
One thread of confirmation to the presence of the Nike Hercules nuclear warheads 
is the performance record of the National Guard in the annual Technical Proficiency 
Inspections (TPI) inspections.  Under the watch of either the Department of the Army 
Inspector General (IG), or the ARADCOM IG, every firing unit was subjected to the TPI 
each year.  For two days a lieutenant colonel and two chief warrant officers examined 
every detail of “…the security, control and safety aspects of nuclear weapons 
operations.”   The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) conducted an additional round of 
 
114 Headquarters, United States Army Air Defense Command, “Special Study – Army National Guard 
Participation in Ballistic Missile Defense.”  Page H-2.  Ent Air Force Base, Colorado. 21 June 1968.  
Unclassified 12 November 1974.  Copy obtained form the personal library of Brigadier General (Retired) 
Neil E. Allgood, Long Beach, California, 15 September 2003. 
115 Author’s personal notes, “Adjutants General Seminar on NMD” National Interagency Civil-
Military Institute (NICI) San Luis Obispo, California, 20-22 June 2001. 
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Technical Standardization Inspections (TSI).  The inspections did not include the launch 
crews.116 The basic analysis of an inspection program of this scope supports the 
conclusion that the DA IG and DNA had a vested interest in validating the ability of the 
National Guard  Nike Hercules units to utilize the prescribed nuclear warheads. 
In the years depicted, 1971-1974, there were 27 National Guard Hercules batteries 
and 11 battalion headquarters (see Table 2 - Nike Firing Units and Personnel).117  
Completing the TPI program alone required the DA and ARADCOM IGs to allocate 
personnel resources to the level of 456 man days (a three person team using two days to 
inspect each site, plus one arrival and one departure travel day for each of the 38 National 
Guard units).  Another 300 man days were necessary to inspect the active Army firing 
units.   The number of active Army battalion, group and brigade headquarters inspected is 
open for speculation.  Table 3 – TPI/TSI Performance, provides a summary of available 
records for 1971-1974.   
Table 3.   TPI/TSI Performance 



















Satisfactory 88% 100% 96% 97% 87% 81% 95.5% 93.3% 
Un-Satisfactory 12% 0% 4% 3% 13% 19% 4.5% 6.7% 
 
A small level of confidence in the efficiency of the DA and ARADCOM IGs 
supports the conclusion that the prospects of a National Guard Nike Hercules unit firing a 
nuclear armed missile were imminent, and that these citizen-soldiers were validated 
through an exhaustive process as being up to the task.  On an operational level, it is 
difficult to design a defensive plan on an assumption that up to 50% of the firing units 
would not be able to engage attacking Soviet bomber formation without the availability 
of the nuclear warhead. 
Such a design is inconsistent with the NORAD provision requiring that National 
Guard Hercules units “…maintain an advanced state of alert identical to that of a Regular 
                                                 
116 Departments of the Army and Air Force National Guard Bureau, The Army National Guard in Air 
Defense 1951-1974.  Pages 100-101.  Washington, D.C., January 1975. 
117 Ibid, Table 6 Rise and Decline of the ARNG Nike Program, page 89. 
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Army Hercules Unit.”118  In the spirit of that requirement, the local air defense 
commanders faced a clear requirement to ensure that their National Guard batteries were 
ready to launch even the nuclear missile.  Otherwise, a disproportionate level of 
responsibility, training, readiness and inspections would have fallen exclusively on the 
active Army batteries.  The facts of the TPI/TSI program defy this conclusion. Achieving 
the NORAD alert status falls into the realm of the ARADCOM Operational Readiness 
Evaluation (ORE) grades of Fully Combat Ready (FCR), Combat Ready (CR),or Not 
Combat Ready (NCR).  The records from 1971 to 1974 are shown in Table 4 – ORE 
Performance. 
 
Table 4.   ORE Performance 


















FCR 14.3% 33.3% 20% 29.4% 14.3% 41.9% 56% 65.5% 
CR 71.4% 66.7% 30% 35.3% 57.1% 57.1% 32% 27.6% 
NCR 14.3% 0 50% 35.3% 28.6% 12.9% 12% 6.9% 
FCR = Fully Combat Ready CR = Combat Ready NCR = Not Combat Ready 
 
Table 4 indicates that the ORE was a demanding program that saw very few units 
achieve top grades until the final years.  In the course of a broad analysis, from a policy 
perspective, the evidence of first-hand experience, and the records of ARADCOM it is a 
reasonable conclusion to accept that the responsibility and trust of nuclear warheads was 
conveyed to the National Guard Nike Hercules units.  Combined with this confidence is 
an overall record of National Guard excellence in the most demanding evaluations of the 
Nike program. 
4. Excellence in All Respects 
Old Sacramento, California, boasts among its shops and restaurants the California 
State Military Museum.  Among its collection are two enormous trophies that pay tribute 
to the dedication and skill of the active Army and National Guard soldiers who performed 
the Nike mission from Ajax to Hercules.  In a command that relied heavily on inspections 
and a spirit of competition, the ARADCOM Commander’s Trophy rivaled the importance 
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of the National Hockey League’s Stanley Cup, or the National Football League’s 
Lombardi Trophy (awarded at the Superbowl), except that the former represented the best 
in the business of defending the nation against foreign attack. 
A large reason for the existence of ARADCOM’s periodic “ARGUS” magazine 
was to report on the progress and performance of the Nike Firing batteries.  Once a year a 
specified number of select soldiers from each unit would arrive at Fort Bliss, Texas and 
prove their skills to a minute level of scrutiny.  Short Notice Annual Practice (SNAP) and 
the later title, Annual Service Practice (ASP), was the equivalent of an Air Defense 
“Olympics” that provided a final report card of satisfactory (70% to 100% grade) or 
Unsatisfactory (grade below70%).119  At a rapid pace, achieving 100% became a mark of 
honor that fell twice on an active Army battery, and eleven times on batteries assigned to 
the National Guard.  The bulk of these awards found their way to where Nike started for 
the National Guard: California. 
The presence of the trophies in Sacramento commemorates the decision of the 
ARADCOM Commanding General to retire these awards in 1974 where they had gained 
the highest levels of performance and honor.120  Not only had individual California Nike 
batteries repeatedly achieved 100% scores in the ASP, but the original 720th Missile 
Battalion in the Los Angeles area defense gained the title “King Battalion.” 
The record of these achievements is not found in the official National Guard 
history.  Thankfully, the archives of the ARADCOM “ARGUS” magazine are sufficient 
to detail the achievements in the Los Angeles area of the re-titled 4th Missile Battalion 
251st Artillery (4/251st).  The record begins in May 1966 when Battery D, 4/251st scored 
a perfect 100%.  National Guard batteries from Pennsylvania and Missouri soon matched 
the achievement.  The spirit of competition was ignited and for the remaining eight years 
of ARADCOM’s history National Guard 100% marks peppered the record books. 
Three years later Battery B and Battery C, 4/251st would also achieve 100% 
making the battalion the first command in ARADCOM to have a record of two 
subordinate batteries with that distinction in the same year.  The 4/251st closed the 1970 
 
119 ARGUS, August 1968, pages 4-5.  ARGUS, November 1972, page 9. 
120 ARGUS, April 1974, page 4. 
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SNAP competition with a combined average of 99.6.  Battery A had scored 99.7 and 
Battery D was low on the card with 98.8.121  Before the end of 1970 Battery A would 
also achieve a 100%.  During a recognition ceremony the ARADCOM Commanding 
General, Lt. Gen. George V. Underwood, Jr., proclaimed this distinction. 
During this time this battalion has won 11 E (excellence) awards; 
designation as an Outstanding Battalion in SNAP in ’62; Outstanding 
National Guard Battalion in ARADCOM twice; best SNAP Battery six 
times.  Btry. D has twice won this distinction with a 99.4 in  ’63 and 100 
in ‘66.  Btry C scored 99.8 in ’67; B and C each scored 100 in ’70 and 
now Btry. A has now scored 100 per cent in FY (fiscal year) 71.122
Receiving a special plaque that day was the ten-year commander of the battalion, 
Lt. Col Neil E. Allgood.  Standing behind his right shoulder was Capt. Howard G. Crist 
who would succeed Lt. Col. Allgood as battalion commander.  In 1971, Lt. Col. Allgood 
was promoted to Colonel, and moved on to become ARADCOM’s Chief, Office of 
Reserve Forces. 
Further north along the California coast National Guard Nike units assigned to the 
San Francisco are defense began to take their share of SNAP/ASP honors.  Battery A, 1st 
Missile Battalion 250th Air Defense Artillery recorded the only back to back 100% 
scores in 1972 and 1973.  Another 4/251st 100% was recorded by Battery A before 
October 1973.  In total, at least one California National Guard Nike Hercules battery 
brought home a 100% score every year beginning in 1969.123  This distinctive 5-year 
competition would end with the decline of the Nike Hercules mission and thousands of 
National Guard missile unit technicians searching for new employment. 
The decision to end 23-years of ARADCOM service was summarized in the 
February 1974 edition of the “ARGUS.”  Starting in March, all of the Nike Hercules 
units would act in succession to take their combat ready systems off-line and close the 
majority of the missile sites.  This placed a distinctive burden on the National Guard 
technicians.  While the active Army soldiers were chaperoned through the career 
transition process to other U.S. Army specialties, the 2,764 National Guard technicians 
 
121 ARGUS, July 1970, pages 3 – 9. 
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61 
                                                
faced a competitive process of reassignments throughout the United States.  From his 
ARADCOM office, Colonel Neil E. Allgood faced the task of coordinating this effort 
between the National Guard Bureau and the 48 contiguous states’ Adjutant’s General.124
The prospects facing the “King Battalion” offer insights to the experience across 
the nation.  In a reduction in force action, 486 Nike missile technicians were notified of 
368 vacancies within their home state.  The majority of the available jobs were in 
maintenance shops, equipment motor pools and four aviation maintenance activities.  
While the outlook for officers and warrant officers was grim, Lt. Col. Howard G. Crist, 
the battalion commander, summarized a three step process for his enlisted men, “I think 
every enlisted man who wants a job will get one, but he must be willing to: one, relocate; 
two, accept a lower grade (pay); and three, retrain.”125  For the officers, he expected up to 
a four pay grade reduction.  In the final analysis, he saw the biggest problems in the 
prospects of the men having to abandon the roots they had developed in the communities 
that hosted the Nike Missile sites.  In the shadow of the rapidly closing Nike Hercules 
units, the promise of future missions under ballistic missile defense also began to fade. 
5. ICBM Defense: Nike Zeus, Sentinel and Safeguard 
For many years, active Army and National Guard Nike crewmen believed that as 
Ajax led to Hercules, so too would Nike Zeus replace Hercules.  In the case of each 
evolving weapons system, the next generation was bigger, faster, more devastating and 
required fewer sites to protect the same geographic area.  What these soldiers had not 
been able to foresee was the decline of the Soviet bomber threat, the eventual rise of 
ICBM supremacy, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 
In September 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, announced an 
austere (by 1967 standards) anti-ballistic missile program named Sentinel.  By protecting 
17 sites he stated that Sentinel would protect the United States from a future attack by  
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Chinese ICBMs, but not a Soviet attack.126  In the 1968 election, the political tides of the 
tumultuous presidential campaign would place Richard Nixon, rather than Hubert 
Humphrey, in the White House. 
With the change of administration, the purpose of BMD shifted to protecting 
America’s nuclear deterrent forces.  Sentinel became Safeguard and the design was 
reduced to a maximum of 12 announced sites in 1969.  Of those, only four were budgeted 
for construction.  The signing of the ABM Treaty with the Soviet Union brought all plans 
except the Grand Forks, North Dakota project to a halt.  The ABM Treaty compliant site 
for Washington D.C. was never started.  The impressive missile system for Safeguard has 
been well documented, but what is not easily discerned is the extent of the Department of 
the Army’s plans to continue a National Guard contribution to the mission. 
The dual-interceptor design for Safeguard relied on the long-range Spartan, and 
close-range Sprint missiles.  Both remained true to the nuclear warhead proximity 
detonation that became prevalent with Nike Hercules, and continued in the Nike Zeus, 
that was intended for the defunct Sentinel program.127  Beginning with the October 1970 
issue, “ARGUS” published a series of reports on the progress of both Sprint and Spartan. 
From the magazine accounts, both missiles were technological marvels for the 
early 1970s.  The instantaneous launching Sprint was available to intercept any targets 
that were able to sneak past the first-round Spartan.  Spartan was the multiple stage 
missile that had progressed through a long series of intercept tests launched between 
Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.  The 
May 1972 “ARGUS” recorded the performance of both Sprint and Spartan in 28 test 
launches; 24 were graded a success, with two partial and two unsuccessful.  A later issue, 
August 1973, claimed that a total of 43 test launches had been conducted. 
For those in the National Guard with the correct security clearance the progress of 
these tests offered some small assurance of a future mission.  The background 
 
126 Morgan, Mark L., and Berhow, Mark A., Rings of Supersonic Steel: Air Defenses of the United 
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information a few key decisions makers assuredly held rests in the June 1968 
ARADCOM “Phase I Special Study” ordered by the Department of the Army. 
Problem.  The deployment of a ballistic missile defense system in the 
United States may create a serious drain on high quality personnel from 
other critical areas into a single weapons system.  A method must be found 
to reduce this drain on the active Army.  One possible solution is the 
Army National Guard. 128
While documentation exists to show that the first phase of the study was 
completed, there is no indication that this continued to the second phase of coordination 
with the states and the National Guard Bureau.  The purpose for the Special Study was 
summarized in this way. 
PROBLEM.  To determine the extent of participation in the operational 
manning of the ballistic missile defenses of the United States by the 
National Guard.  This is to be determined in two phases.  Phase I is to 
determine the extent of Army National Guard participation feasible and 
practicable.  Phase II will determine the capability and willingness of the 
Army National Guard to participate in the SENTINEL program.129
The phase I study accomplished a detailed analysis of existing National Guard 
Nike Hercules sites as compared to the proposed Sentinel System.  When coupled with 
the statistical analysis of unit performance it presented a picture of a capable and reliable 
National Guard missile defense structure with units that were the equal of their active 
Army counterparts.  A surprising finding is the declaration of acceptable personnel 
turnover in the National Guard Nike units, but personnel turbulence in active Army units 
“…far beyond acceptable limits.” 130
In connection with this human resources line of analysis, the report continued by 
praising the National Guard’s community based recruiting organizations.  The often-
difficult area of security clearances was found to present no barrier to the National Guard 
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providing soldiers for the Sentinel mission.131  Despite this six-year lead-time, there is no 
indication of a National Guard soldier performing operational duties at the final North 
Dakota Safeguard site before it went into care taker status in February, 1976.132  The last 
element of 25-years of defending the United States against bomber or missile attack had 
closed its doors as active Army and National Guard Nike veterans moved on to new 
duties, or entirely new careers. 
6. Summary 
Dr. Michael D. Doubler offers these conclusions on the accomplishments of 
citizen-soldiers in the Nike Hercules program: 
First, Guardsmen established themselves as a readily available asset, fully 
capable of participating in the first line of defense against the nation’s 
most dangerous threats. 
Second, Guardsmen proved themselves of quickly and confidently 
mastering high technology weaponry. 
Third, Guard participation in the missile defense program resulted in 
significant manpower and dollar savings for the active Army.  At a time 
when the Army was attempting to maintain an active force of fifteen 
divisions, ARNG missile units each year yielded an annual cost savings of 
$11.9 million and enough personnel spaces to man nearly two combat 
brigades. 133
The progress of time is closing opportunities to record more facts and the subtle 
nuances of the National Guard in Nike Hercules.  Just as recent events have emphasized 
the rapid passing of the Veterans of World War II, so too will this reality catch up with 
the history of Nike.  Thankfully, the collection of documents and artifacts held by Nike 
veterans like Neil Allgood remain accessible; but for how long?  The 1968 ARADCOM 
“Special Study” offers the critical insight that National Guard citizen-soldiers manning a 
ballistic missile defense unit received serious examination at the earliest stages of 
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Sentinel/Safeguard.  Almost 36 years later, citizen-soldiers in Alaska and Colorado are on 
the verge of performing the hands-on work of BMDS. 
B. THE NATIONAL GUARD MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION 
Sufficient evidence exists that the National Guard missile defense mission was an 
accepted fact between the U.S. Army and the National Guard Bureau by 1996.  By June 
2001 a large assembly of U.S. Army, NGB and state representatives were learning the 
history and precedents that supported this mission and sharing information that would 
lead to enhanced planning and overall success.134
On 16 August 2000, the U.S. Army Space Command (USSPACECOM) had 
already conducted a missile defense exercise.  Two goals guided the event:  1) examine 
the importance and impact of rules of engagement; and 2) give the operational 
community a chance to practice making critical operational decisions using the current 
version of the National Missile Defense battle management software.135
Operators from USSPACECOM, NORAD, Air Force Space Command, the 
Department of Defense, defense contractors and members of the Alaska and North 
Dakota National Guard were present.  North Dakota Guardsman Capt. Sean Johnson 
summarized his experience, “As an NMD warfighter, it is especially important to 
understand the big picture so I can best apply my skills in the fire direction center.”136  
Assembling the citizen-soldiers and teaching them the proper skills thus becomes the next 
topic of examination. 
1. BMDS Minutemen in Colorado and Alaska 
In response to news out of Washington, D.C., in December 2002, the Adjutant 
General of Alaska, Maj. Gen. Phil Oates went on the public record about missile 
defense.137  At that point, General Oates expected 67 full-time Guard members in Alaska.  
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Within months the National Guard Bureau public Internet site was showing a multiple-
part job announcement for 85 positions summarized as “..Battalion 
Commander…Brigade Commander, Air Defense Artillery, and Military Police.”138
The April 2004 issue of the National Guard Bureau’s “ONGUARD” newsletter 
provides details on the results, and changes, from that initial announcement and the 
expectations of Gen. Oates.139  The Alaska Guard unit had gained the title 49th Ground-
based Midcourse Defense Battalion, and in Colorado, it is the 100th Missile Defense 
Brigade.  Both units are under the command of National Guard officers.  Alaska’s 
manpower number has grown to 110 full time National Guard men and women, and the 
Colorado unit consists of 77 National Guard and 13 active Army members.  From the 
initial announcement of 85 planned for assignment to the BMDS mission there are now 
an even 200, 187 National Guard and the 13 active Army.  According to the 
“ONGUARD” article the Alaska unit includes “…volunteers from as far as the beaches 
of the Virgin Islands, who are eager to serve as the sentinels and tacticians in this first-of-
its-kind National Guard missile defense unit.” 
2. A Unique Role in the National Military Structure 
This is a one-of-a-kind unit in the Army and National Guard.  Defending 
the nation against ballistic missile attack is more than the average National 
Guard (soldier) does.  We are faced with some unique challenges because 
we work operationally within a unified command structure and 
administratively through state channels. – Maj. Gregory S. Bowen, 
Commander, 49th Ground-based Mid-course Defense Battalion.140
Maj. Bowen’s statement emphasizes a fundamental characteristic of the BMDS 
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were disbanded at the symbolic ceremony encasing their flags in September 1974.141  
Just as in the Nike era, National Guard BMDS units are administratively supported by 
their state’s Adjutant General, but report in an operational channel to the U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command.  These operational duties become the critical piece 
of the decision to establish these units in the National Guard. 
The decision for the BMDS to have a terminal kinetic interceptor offers a 
command and control (C2) advantage to the Citizen-Soldier operators and the operational 
channels leading back to the President of the United States.  Stephen Cimbala presents a 
scenario that places the decision to fire an interceptor at the National Command 
Authorities (NCA) level.142  This is inaccurate and unlikely.  Two facts are paramount: 
first; BMDS is a defensive system, and second; the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) 
does not include a nuclear warhead.  There is no need for a Presidential order to engage 
an attacking ICBM in the BMDS.  Undeniably, the order to retaliate with an American 
thermo-nuclear ICBM can only be made by the President.  What is not known is how 
high the question of whether or not to launch a kinetic, non-nuclear, non-explosive 
intercept will go in the Bush Administration before the decision is made.  For a majority 
of BMD, and some international relations, observers this is a significant improvement. 
Despite the pronouncement by Julian Palmore that a nuclear proximity warhead 
inceptor is the most assured option,143 such a change is unsupportable.  Mr. Palmore 
accurately notes that such a device would certainly compromise the space weapons ban, 
and more significantly, fail to gain U.S. popular support.  Any contemporary suggestion 
of a nuclear capable EKV is an unrealistic proposal. 
From a practical and procedural perspective, the designers of the American 
BMDS have gained significant speed in decision-making steps of the detect, decide and 
launch cycle.  Continuing with the EKV system allows for Rules of Engagement that 
should include the delegation of the launch/intercept decision to lower levels of 
command, eventually to the level where a National Guard warfighter like Capt. Johnson 
 
141 Doubler, page 243. 
142 Cimbala, Stephen J., “Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense.”  Defense and 
Security Analysis.  Page 210.  Vol. 18 No. 3, September 2002. Carfax Publishing, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 
Philadelphia, PA. 
would presumably press the launch button.  This is further supported by a reasonable 
assumption that BMDS battle management command and control software exercises have 
continued since August 2000.  Such a lengthy record of testing and likely simulation 
gives an assurance of an effective and rigorous set of rules of engagement (ROE). 
Mr. Palmore does introduce an interesting model that updates the old nuclear 
“triad” (Figure 4 – The Cold War Triad).144  He suggests that the U.S. cold war doctrine 
of bombers, submarines and ICBMs has been absorbed as a single corner of a larger, new 
triad.  This has expanded to include Homeland Defense (BMDS) at the second point, and 
Civil Preparedness - defending against the terrorist use of Chemical Biological 




Adapted from Palmore, pg 263  
Figure 4.   The Cold War Triad 
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Figure 5.   The New Triad 
 
National Guard Colonel Mike Sainz described the BMDS as a National Guard 
Homeland Defense mission with connections to Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules.145  The 
Bush Administration has clearly assigned BMDS to the Department of Defense, rather 
than the Department of Homeland Security.  All of the key announcements regarding 
BMDS, and specifically the GMD program, have been made by figures in the Pentagon.  
Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, announced in April 
2004 that BMDS would go operational as early as the summer of 2004.146  During an 
August 2004 missile defense conference in Huntsville, Alabama, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld said that he was still working out the specifics and awaiting the final readiness 
assessment.147  Surprisingly, the significance of that announcement generates only 
minimal notice outside of Delta Junction, Alaska. 
BMDS is big business 100 miles southeast of Fairbanks, Alaska.  As Maj. 
Bowen’s 110 National Guard soldiers prepare for their one-of-a-kind mission, the city 
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manager of Delta Junction, Pete Hallgren, is assessing the impacts of a Department of 
Defense  $25  million  dollar  program  that  will  buy the community a new grade school, 
library, a landfill, a fire station, and partially finance a recreation center.148
What is still needed beyond the comforts of life for the Alaska BMD Minutemen 
is evidence of an exercise and inspection program that approximates the rigors their 
predecessors experienced with Nike Hercules.  The necessity of this is two-fold: first, the 
National Guard soldiers require a quantitative measurement of their skills and 
performance, and second, the National Guard leadership must have a single measurement 
of the success of their soldiers to present as the GMD debate continues. 
The Bush Administration decision to deploy a limited GMD capability is not the 
end of the controversy.  For while well meaning citizen-soldiers have accepted the 
mission, it is entirely within the authority of the national political leadership to reduce, or 
eliminate, GMD.  All of Major Bowen’s soldiers should heed the lesson of the Mickelson 
Complex.  Just as that completed, and fully operational, BMD facility now sits idle on the 
North Dakota plains, the same fate could befall their operation in Alaska.  While the 
political process is conceptually, and practically, beyond their influence, the National 
Guard BMD soldiers can pursue an undeniable record of proficiency and build a record 
that deserves the full confidence of the nation in their ability to complete their assigned 
mission. 
In the Nike Hercules era, that confidence revolved around an unrelenting drive by 
National Guard unit leaders to train their soldiers to know their duties, and be able to 
perform them before any inspector.  Whatever the format of the inspection checklist, this 
same responsibility now falls on the citizen-soldiers assigned to the GMD mission by the 
National Guard.  The heritage of their Nike Hercules predecessors serves as a source of 
inspiration and a demonstration of confidence and assurance for those in the U.S. Army, 
the Department of Defense, and the U.S. government who would hold doubts. 
 
148 Glanz, James, “Star Wars: The next Version.”  The New York Times. The New York Times 




For the Department of the Army and Department of Defense there resides the 
responsibility to strictly direct and manage the GMD program as a military mission 
whose purpose is to defend the nation.  A contentious political environment conveys the 
risk that the duty performance of GMD citizen-soldiers could become subjugated to 
serving the purposes of the competing presidential campaigns.  The progress of the GMD 
deployment is already part of the 2004 Presidential Campaign.  News reports, magazine 
and newspaper articles, and campaign commercials are all competing for the attention of 
the American people.  It is not reasonable to believe that the individual citizen-soldiers 
assigned to the GMD mission unaware of these influences.  Rather than serving any 
candidate’s needs to sway the decisions of “swing-voters,” the Department of Defense 
must ensure everyone associated with the National Guard GMD units is focused on 
training, achieving mission readiness indicators, and ultimately providing America with a 
defense against ICBM attack. 
The format of this training and evaluation program must adhere to time-proven 
U.S. Army institutionalized procedures.  The creation of GMD Field Manuals, Mission 
Training Plans, and Soldiers Manuals are all a necessary part of normalizing the duties of 
the soldiers, regardless of the political debate that is likely to continue around them.  The 
measurement of success must originate in the “Task, Condition and Standards” of U.S. 
Army doctrinal publications and not the favorable impact of GMD subject matter press 
announcements on Presidential election poll standings. 
As the political process advances the leaders of both the GMD advocates and 
opponents owe those in uniform the courtesy, and dignity, of leaving them out of the 
political fray.  Unfortunately, the invasive nature of contemporary journalism and 
political maneuvering provide a high risk of the opposite.  Increased access to members 
of the military by the news media need not include sound bites of personal comments 
from members of the Alaska, California, or Colorado National Guard recording their 
commitment to the GMD mission. 
The National Guard commitment to GMD, and assured success performing that 
mission, will reside in a history that records interceptors and EKVs fired to support a 
continuing test and evaluation program, and exceptional scores from individuals and 
72 
teams in exercises and inspections.  This is the culmination of the National Guard’s Nike 
Hercules heritage, and the trust placed in the 21st Century Minutemen and women of the 
new National Guard GMD units. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
It is Difficult to say what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday is the 
hope of today and the reality of tomorrow. – Dr. Robert H. Goddard 
A. OBSERVATIONS 
The national defense needs of the American people are well served by the citizen-
soldiers who will operate the GMD system.  Among the analytical assurances to this 
statement are the precedents shown by an earlier generation of missile age minutemen 
during the Nike program, the evidence of the ARADCOM Sentinel Special Study, and 
the record of GMD preparation and professionalism since 1996.  What stands as an 
obstacle to be watched is the continuing saga of the place ballistic missile defense holds 
in the American political process. 
Critical assessment of President George W. Bush’s mandate to have BMDS 
operational by 30 September 2004 provides an unsettling link to the election less than 
five weeks later.  Political operatives are taking sides on the issue, and the citizen-soldiers 
are once again left with an uncertain future.149  Herein lies the greatest threat to the 
volunteers who have come forward to serve in the 49th Ground-based Mid-course 
Defense Battalion and the 100th Missile Defense Brigade:  that their mission, careers and 
employment are only as secure as the next Presidential election. 
Dr. Michael Doubler provides this insight on the subject of the National Guard 
performing operational missions: 
A number of patterns emerge from the experience of Army-Guard 
integration.  As a general rule, whenever a clear danger is capable of 
threatening the American homeland, the National Guard shares in the 
defensive role.  Initially, the Army carries the main onus of homeland 
defense, but as new threats emerge or conditions change, the Army 
determines that additional resources are required.  At this time, the ARNG 
assumes responsibility for the mission.  Eventually, the Army’s priorities 
and attentions are drawn toward new threats, and Citizen-Soldiers assume 
the responsibility for nearly all of the original effort.  In due time, the 
perceived threat recedes, and the Army terminates the program in order to 
 
149 Ibid, in regards to the comments of Senator Levin, Senator Warner, Dr. Garwin, Mr. Coyle, and 
Col. Norgaard. 
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pursue new priorities.  Such was the overall pattern of Army-Guard 
integration during the coast artillery defense of America’s shores and the 
Nike Missile Program. 150
There are few indications that the international factors of ICBM and nuclear 
proliferation portend a dramatic change of direction.  Even on the prospects of North 
Korean and Iranian ICBM ambitions dissolving, this still leaves the danger of accidental 
or unauthorized launch from any of the other ballistic missile powers.  To that end, the 
goal of BMD is sound. 
Classic movie enthusiasts and historians recall the horrific days in World War II 
of the “Battle for Britain.”  At the opening of the 21st Century, there can be no defensible 
position for complacency when planning against the potential for an ICBM to devastate a 
single U.S. city with a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead.  Perhaps then, BMDS is 
yet another indicator the century has truly turned.  Just as the appearance of armored 
dreadnaughts on the seas is accepted as an indicator of the arrival of the 20th Century, it 
is not too far to conclude that the end of global destruction through the exchange of 
nuclear ICBMs as a key indicator of the close of the 20th Century. 
With this ideal and hope for the future, it is still a prudent and honorable 
undertaking to continue the pursuit of BMDS.  However, the National Guard leadership, 
and those who have volunteered for the GMD mission, should proceed with caution.  The 
highest needs of the nation may not hold back in deference to the needs of a few 
courageous citizen soldiers.  While there is a human face to GMD, it is justifiable for the 
American political decision-makers to minimize considerations of the individual human 
impacts of BMDS decisions, while holding a higher regard for the factors that ensure the 
collective defense of the nation.  The residents of Delta Junction, Alaska, the National 
Guard men and women, their families, and countless other active Army and government 
contractor employees must recognize the political risk inherent in the future of GMD.  
The absence of direct combat threats to these units is a small comfort compared to the 
very real risks held in the continuing political controversy, and the potential for 
unfavorable decisions in the Administration or Congress. 
 
150 Doubler, Michael D., I am the Guard:  A History of the National Guard, 1636-2000.  Department 
of the Army Pamphlet 130-1, 2001.  Page 389.  Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C.. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The immediate future of GMD, and the collective U.S. BMDS program, requires 
increased scrutiny and emphasis on maturing the structure of the National Guard GMD 
units, securing America’s borders against the threat of the clandestine delivery of WMDs, 
continuing the campaign against missile technology and WMD proliferation, and 
resolving the controversies surrounding the science and technology of GMD.  To some 
degree, all of these areas will owe some degree of future success to an improved national 
dialogue that removes the divisive and bitter animosity that has characterized the most 
recent years of the NMD/GMD debate. 
Naming the National Guard GMD units and assigning citizen-soldiers to perform 
that mission is only the start.  The accessible public record only makes mention of the 
AGR (Active Guard Reserve) members of these units.  This is partially confirmed when 
the National Guard Bureau’s missile defense office website takes great pains to promote 
applicants for the AGR positions, but makes no mention of how a traditional, part-time, 
citizen-soldier could join these units.  From the gun-era Special Security Force structure 
through to the award-winning Nike Hercules batteries of the California National Guard, 
part-time Guardsmen served side-by-side with their full-time (military technicians, rather 
than AGR) comrades.  Achieving the full institutionalization of the GMD units into the 
364-year tradition of the National Guard includes demonstrating that the purely part-time 
citizen-soldiers can make viable and productive contributions to the mission.  Otherwise, 
there is reason to question whether the GMD mission has only been assigned to National 
Guard AGRs to preclude straining active Army manpower. 
Rather than dismissing this concern as a pessimistic over-reaction, it is necessary 
to recall the well researched conclusion expressed by Dr. Doubler.151  The great contrasts 
between the experience of the National Guard Nike Hercules and GMD units rests in the 
unit size and population, and the increased level of political debate and controversy.  The 
187 National Guard and 13 active Army soldiers assigned to the two units is in stark 
contrast  to  the  tens  of thousands who served in hundreds of units in the Nike Hercules  
 
151 Doubler, page 389 (and on page 73 of this work). 
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era.  A further deviation from the Nike Hercules experience exists where it appears GMD 
has started at the third or fourth stage of Dr. Doubler’s observed organizational 
progression. 
The GMD units are already predominately National Guard.  There is no previous 
active Army unit history, nor a transitional “passing of the flag” as occurred in Los 
Angeles in 1958.  Active Army units have not gradually reduced their participation in 
GMD, but rather are only reflected in the presence of the 13 soldiers assigned to the 
National Guard Brigade Headquarters in Colorado.  This is some indication that either the 
active Army has the highest confidence in the decision to assign the mission to the 
National Guard, or the U.S. Army truly has other priorities.  The longevity of the GMD 
mission again arises as the critical question for the leadership of the National Guard who 
agreed to this mission in 1996, and the citizen-soldiers who are now charged with 
fulfilling that commitment.  In the worst-case scenario, the National Guard GMD citizen-
soldiers must commit themselves to a continuous cycle where they can only be sure of 
their mission continuing until the next national-level election. 
A change in the White House, or Congress, holds the certainty of at least minor 
policy shifts affecting GMD, if not substantial budget diversions.  Thus, every two years 
brings some level of risk to the continuation of the BMDS program.  Even the implied 
political influence of the National Guard and state governors is limited when the GMD 
unit structure has only a direct impact on two or three states.  Realizing the lessons of the 
Nike Hercules deactivation, it is prudent for the leadership of the National Guard to 
prepare contingency plans in the event that this mission would also become obsolete. 
Admirably, the Missile Defense Agency and other Department of Defense entities 
attract the greatest proportion of the political and media pressure directed at BMDS.  
Every effort should be made by the Administration to maintain that relationship with the 
media, along with advancing the broad scope issues of border security, proliferation, and 
BMD technology. 
The continued advancement of BMDS should coincide with U.S. Homeland 
Security improvements to counter the threat of clandestine delivery of WMD into U.S. 
territories, and the non-proliferation efforts represented by the Nunn-Lugar Act programs 
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and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  This represents a greater effort towards 
defeating ICBM attack while preventing those who would harm the United States, its 
friends and allies from acquiring WMDs. 
Clifford Singer points out that the illegal drug trade demonstrates how tons of 
illicit materials are smuggled into the U.S..152  As long as that sieve of access to the 
United States remains open, the clandestine arrival of a WMD is on American soil is not 
confined to the imagination of Hollywood, or the boundaries of fiction.  The brutality and 
thoughtlessness for the sanctity of human life demonstrated in the 11 September 2001 
attacks demands this level of attention to protecting against both ballistic missile attack 
and WMD proliferation. 
Stephen Cimbala offers a critical view of the BMD: “…we have assigned 
defenses much more competency than they are likely to acquire based on current or near-
term technology.  Only defenses based on new physical principles will be able to achieve 
leakage of 20% or lower.”153  A contrasting position would emphasize that Mr. Cimbala 
does not offer an inclusive assessment of all technologies under development.  Quite 
certainly, he cannot, because the Department of Defense and its contractors hold the most 
spectacular and promising items under classified controls.  Further, there is the optimistic 
position that continued test and development refinements, procedural efficiencies, and 
technological breakthroughs support an outlook for advanced performance throughout the 
GMD system. 
Raymond Franck offers this cautionary observation: “…the US should decide 
whether it wants to live with the WMD threat delivered with ballistic missiles, or the 
problem that would replace it in the event of a successful NMD program.”154  This again 
raises the position that the smuggled suitcase bomb is more dangerous to U.S. security 
than ICBMs.  But, neither does the possibility of a smuggled WMD instrument negate the  
 
152 Singer, Clifford, “How Can National Missile Defense Best Enhance Security.”  Vol. 18 No. 3, 
September 2002. Carfax Publishing, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., Philadelphia, PA.  Page 294. 
153 Cimbala.  Page 214. 
154 Franck, Raymond E., Jr., “Expanding the Framework for Analyzing National Missile Defenses: A 
Proposal for Discussion.”  Defense and Security Analysis.  Vo. 18 No. 3,  Page 224.  September 2002 
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factual position that as long as nuclear equipped ICBMs can range U.S. territory the 
threat of these weapons, in any hands, can be mitigated by even a less than perfect BMD 
system. 
This paper joins with Clifford Singer to raise the level of awareness on the issue 
of nuclear weapons material protection, control and accounting (MPCA).155  More robust 
efforts in non-proliferation enforcement show promise of reducing the terrorist threat of 
WMD in both nuclear and radiological (dirty-bomb) scenarios.  However, pursuit of 
MPCA does not justify offering BMD limits as a bargaining point for fissile materials 
limitations.  There are abundant international security, health, and environmental benefits 
to MPCA that clarify it as a broad-scope issue that is not integral to BMD. 
Closure brings the certainty that Mutually Assured Destruction is beyond its 
useful life.  Like the Soviet Union, MAD is now confined to the realm of historical 
analysis.  Similarly, the concept of detecting a missile launch against the United States, 
its friends and allies, and responding with a reciprocal nuclear ICBM attack is 
unacceptable.  The vision of the 21st Century, the prospects of a bright and prolonged 
future for the entire world demands the creation of a viable capability to defeat an 
attacking ICBM before innocents are harmed in any way.  All risks and issues aside, the 
legacy of Nike and Safeguard support a firm conclusion that the National Guard will in 
theory, fact and practice, defend the United States. 
 
155 Singer, Clifford, “How Can National Missile Defense Best Enhance Security.”  Vol. 18 No. 3.  
Page 293.  September 2002. Carfax Publishing, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., Philadelphia, PA. 
APPENDIX A - THE NIKE FAMILY OF MISSILES 
 
From foreground to back:  Nike Zeus, Nike Hercules and Nike Ajax on display at 
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The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) mission is to 
defend against long-range ballistic missile attacks. The 
continuing proliferation of both ballistic missile 
technology and weapons of mass destruction necessitates 
fielding a multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS). During a GMD intercept, a booster missile flies 
toward a target’s predicted location and releases a “kill 
vehicle” on a path with the incoming target. The kill 
vehicle uses data from ground-based radars and its own 
onboard sensors to collide with the target, thus destroying 
both the target and the kill vehicle in the collision. 
Working in conjunction with the other elements of the BMDS, 
GMD will protect the U.S., U.S. forces, friends, and allies. 
On December 17, 2002, the President directed the 
Department of Defense to field initial missile defense 
capabilities beginning in 2004.  The plan calls for fielding 
up to 10 GMD interceptors by 2004 and an additional 10 by 
2005 (for a total of up to 20), in addition to other assets. 
GMD is the most mature missile defense element; therefore, 
it will form the basis for this initial defensive 
operational capability. In addition, the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) will continue to develop, test and improve GMD 
capabilities. 
The following is a closer look at the individual pieces 
of the GMD program:  Satellites: Defense Support Satellites 
(DSP). Air Force DSP satellites will provide the first 
warning of a ballistic missile launch and develop an early 
estimate of where the hostile missile is headed. In the 
future, new satellite constellations will be deployed and 
will assist with choosing the correct object to intercept. 
These new systems, known as Space-Based Infrared System-High 
(SBIRS-High) and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
(STSS), will gradually take over the DSP mission. 
 
Radars: Early Warning Radars: 
MDA is upgrading the hardware and software of existing 
Early Earning Radars (EWRs) that have been used for decades 
to detect and track ballistic missiles targeted at the 
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United States. The upgrades will allow the radar to more 
accurately determine the area where an incoming ballistic 
missile is headed, and allow initial planning for an 
intercept. The radars that will be used are located in the 
Alaskan Aleutian Islands, coastal California, and overseas. 
X-Band Radar: 
 The X-Band Radar (XBR) is designed to search for, 
detect, and track enemy missiles, as well as determine which 
objects are warheads and which are decoys or debris. After 
interception of an enemy missile, the XBR can provide an 
assessment of the success. MDA is currently developing and 
constructing a sea-based XBR for the Test Bed and initial 
defensive operations. This radar’s completion is planned for 
2005. 
Ground Based Interceptor: 
The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), including both a 
booster missile and a kill vehicle, flies toward the 
target’s predicted location, receives in-flight updates, and 
then releases the kill vehicle on a path with the incoming 
target. In current testing, the GBIs are launched from the 
Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands in the South 
Pacific. For the Test Bed and defensive operations, MDA is 
currently constructing a missile field at Fort Greely in 
central Alaska. 
The kill vehicle uses on-board sensors to acquire the 
target and, with assistance from ground-based assets, 
discriminates the actual warhead from any accompanying 
decoys. The kill vehicle then adjusts its trajectory to 
collide with the target. Both the kill vehicle and the 
target are demolished in the collision, which occurs at a 
closing velocity of approximately 4.6 miles per second 
(16,560 miles per hour) at an altitude of approximately 144 
miles. 
GMD Fire Control and Communications (GFC/C): 
The GFC/C component is essentially GMD’s central 
nervous system. It consists of the hardware, software and 
communications systems necessary for planning, tasking and 
controlling GMD. GFC/C enables personnel to understand the 
situation, make informed decisions, and control defense 
against a limited ballistic missile attack. It provides 
mission and engagement planning, situation assessment, 
system responses and centralized command and control. 
The BMDS Test Bed 
In order to allow for more stressing testing of the 
BMDS, including the GMD element, MDA is developing and 
constructing a Test Bed that is expected to be completed by 
September 30, 2004. This BMDS Test Bed will allow testing at 
angles, speeds and conditions that closely replicate 
operational defensive scenarios. 
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The GMD element’s primary objectives are: (1) to 
complete development of an Initial Defensive Operations 
(IDO) capability based on the BMDS Test Bed and augmented 
with additional developmental assets to begin operation in 
2004-2005; and (2) to continue a robust test and evaluation 
program to mature GMD technologies. 
Key parts of the IDO/Test Bed are planned or already 
under construction in Alaska, California, Colorado, and the 
Marshall Islands. The highest profile pieces of the IDO/Test 
Bed are located in Alaska where MDA, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and several contractors have completed digging 
six missile silos and are constructing several support 
facilities. On Shemya Island, one of the most distant 
islands in the Aleutian chain, the existing COBRA DANE EWR 
is being upgraded in order to support flight tests and 
monitor potential enemy missile launches. Additional work is 
planned for the Kodiak Launch Complex, on Alaska’s south 
coast, to allow for target launches. MDA is evaluating the 
environmental impacts of all this work in accordance with 
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APPENDIX C – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AA Active Army 
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
ABL Airborne Laser 
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ADA Air Defense Artillery 
ARADCOM Army Air Defense Command 
ARNG Army Reserve and National Guard 
ASP Annual Service Practice (see also, SNAP) 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense 
BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Office 
BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 
C2 Command and Control 
CBO Congressional Budget Office 
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
CONUS Continental United States 
CR Combat Ready 
DA Department of the Army 
DNA Defense Nuclear Agency 
DOD Department of Defense 
DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 
EKV Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle 
FCR Fully-Combat Ready 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMD 
Ground-based Mid-course Defense or Global Missile 
Defense 
GOP Grand Old Party (Republican) 
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
IG Inspector General 
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction 
MDA Missile Defense Agancy 
MIIS Monterrey Institute of International Studies 
MPCA Material Control Protection and Accountability 
MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle 
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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCA National Command Authority 
NCR Non-Combat Ready 
NG National Guard 
NGB National Guard Bureau 
NMD National Missile Defense 
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
NSPS National Security Personnel System 
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
ORE Operational Readiness Evaluation 
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 
SEC DEF Secretary of Defense 
SNAP Short-Notice Annual Practice (see also, ASP) 
SSF Special Security Forces 
TBM Theater Ballistic Missile or Tactical Ballistic Missile 
TPI Technical Proficiency Inspection 
TSI Technical Security Inspection 
USD AT&L 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics 
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 
USSPACECOM United States Space Command 
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